研究與發展(research and development, &D)在企業長期發展策略中，扮演舉足輕重的角色，且與企業的成長及獲利息息相關。但企業經理人面臨來自董事會及資本市場的「重短期、輕長期」壓力，經常會以縮減R&D支出，作為提高帳面盈餘，進而刺激股價的手段。本研究以企業如何操弄R&D支出為探討主題，將管理短視(management myopia)定義為同時存在「異常盈餘提高、且R&D支出低於正常水準」者，建立預測模型，計算各項變數的「預期值」與「實際值」的差距，作為企業短視與否的判斷依據。本研究結論發現，進行短視管理公司的股票交易，初期確有顯著異常報酬，但拉長觀測窗口，則出現異常報酬反轉的現象，短視管理產生長期價值破壞的後果。

R&D plays an important role in developing long-term strategy of firms and is aligned with the goal of growth and profitability. But some myopic managers often have incentives to artificially inflate current-term earnings by cutting R&D expenditures, and thereby increase the stock price. We define the firms that simultaneously report greater than normal profits and lower than normal R&D spending are engaged in myopic management. In order to identify potentially myopic firms, we first determine the "normal" or expected level of profitability and R&D intensity for each firm for each time period, then use the forecast errors in these models as the estimates of the deviation of the series from the norm in each period. We can use these values to perform classification of firms into potentially myopic and non-myopic groups. We contrast the performance of potentially myopic firms' portfolio with the benchmark portfolios to examine their relative short and long-term performance. In our conclusion, the financial markets appear not to be properly valuing the firms engaging in myopic management, myopic firms are initially overvalued; that is, they have negative abnormal returns in subsequent years. Although myopic management has some short-term benefits in terms of higher current term earnings and stock price, it has a detrimental long-term impact on firm value.