"Historical determinism" has different meanings, formulations, or versions. All of those versions have a common claim: we can find evolutionary patterns or regularities and, based on those regularities, predict futures of human societies. Although historical determinism has been traditionally took as a metaphysical doctrine, it can be treated as a methodological position which claimshistorically or socially scientific researches should find patterns or laws in the evolution of human societies. Is historical determinism, as a methodological position, adequate and available? In his eloquent monograph, The Poverty of Historicism, Popper argued historical determinism was a wrong methodological position. I attempt to argue against Popper's view and point out to the adequacy and availability of some version of historical determinism can be justified, based on a reinterpretation of "scientific laws". Popper's characterization of historical determinism is based on the interpretation of scientific laws as universal statements. It's a wrong understanding from which "the poverty of historicism" results. A modelbased understanding of scientific laws, which correctly grasps the nature of scientific laws and stemmed from latest philosophy of science after 1980s, will provide a well-formed ground for the adequacy and availability of historical determinism. Historical determinism is therefore a thesis which c1aimsthere are deterministic patterns or laws in the historical development of human societies. A deterministic pattern or law means that the initial state of a system at one time would determine every states of the system at any time after that time. Every states of the system at each time are unique so that we can predict exactly the future of a social system.