西洋哲學家通常把「自我意識」當作理論哲學問題，而把「良知」當作實踐哲學問題，兩者分屬不同的哲學領域。中國哲學自孟子以降的心學傳統則有一種特殊的傾向，亦即將兩個問題都放在實踐哲學領域來處理，而當代新儒家的牟宗三（1909-1995 ）把這種理論傾向發揮到極致。費希特（J.G. Fichte, 1762-1814 ）則是西洋少數將兩者當作實踐問題來處理的哲學家。值得注意的是，兩人都以批判康德的「自我意識」理論得出實踐意義的「自我」的結論。本文想要論述以下兩點：(1) 兩人具有類似的「實踐自我」的理論；(2) 牟宗三將「實踐自我」等同於「良知」，而費希特則將「實踐自我」視為純智的思想，「良知」則是道德情感，兩者並不等同。

Most of the Western philosophers regard self-consciousness as a problem of theoretical philosophy, and conscience as a problem of practical philosophy. Both of them belong to different areas of philosophy. In contrast with this, some philosophers in the tradition of Confucianism tend to ascribe both concepts to practical philosophy. This tendency reaches its highest point in the writings of Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), the most important representative of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Fichte (1762-1814) is one of few Western philosophers, who regard both concepts as the problems of practical philosophy. It’s worthy to notice that both Mou Zongsan and Fichte come to this conclusion by criticizing Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. I argue in this paper the following two points: (1) Mou Zongsan and Fichte have similar idea of practical self-consciousness. (2) Mou Zongsan identifies practical self-consciousness with conscience; on the contrary, Fichte holds them to be heterogeneous, the former is pure thinking and the latter sensible feeling.