The question of the priority of the sense of justice is concerned with why and how rational individuals can have sufficient and effective motivation to comply with the demand of justice. This essay argues that John Rawls has adopted a theory of congruence of the right and the good to answer the question. This theory is necessary because Rawls's account of deontology and the notion of priority of the right over the good do not really deal with the problem of motivational priority. To justify this kind of priority, we must provide sufficient reasons to show that the sense of justice is the most important good in one's rational plan of life. Rawls's solution is to appeal to a Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness. I point out that the biggest problem of congruence is that in a modern pluralistic society, Rawls’s account of deliberative rationality cannot assure that all rational individuals would accept this Kantian interpretation of human nature given the diversity of ultimate ends. It is this internal inconsistency that forces later Rawls to make a turn to political liberalism.