對會員國經濟政策的監督，向來都是國際貨幣基金的職能之一。事實上，由國際組織根據共同之規範架構，對國際貨幣體系與個別的國家經濟政策，行使一定質量的監督，早在國家聯盟時代即已開始－雖然國聯的政治屬性明顯強過於經濟層面。在布雷頓森林體系與平價制尚未崩解，且監督機制亦未出現時，國際貨幣基金在維繫平價制外最主要的任務，是鼓勵會員國朝向經常帳自由化的目標邁進。而監督機制，是布雷頓森林崩潰後的產物。任何對國際貨幣基金監督職能所做的分析與評價，無可避免都會觸及極廣泛的議題，法學上亦不例外。在實踐上，基金的監督職能顯非一確定範疇之概念。事實上，如同當今實踐所顯示出者，監督所反映出的是一連串重疊但在概念上彼此相異的規範目的。在監督的本體論部分，本文先以監督的沿革與基金組織協定第四條之相關規範架構起首，接著分述國家貨幣主權、監督的原則、程序，以及磋商的具體實踐內容，最後則以監督下之磋商在國際爭端解決上之意義作爲結束。

Scrutiny of members' economic policies has always been one of the functions of the IMF. Indeed, the concept of a degree of oversight of the international monetary system, undertaken by an international organization and based on some common framework of norms for the economic policies of individual countries, originated with the League of Nations, although the League was a political rather than economic organization. In the immediate postwar period, the IMF's main task, in addition to the oversight of the Bretton Woods par value system, was to encourage members to move toward current account convertibility. And surveillance, chronologically, is a creature after collapse of Bretton Woods. It is to be expected that any comprehensive evaluation of the Fund's surveillance activities will touch upon an impressive range of issues. In practice, it is clear that Fund surveillance is far from being one unified concept. In fact, as currently practiced, surveillance reflects a number of overlapping but conceptually distinct purposes. Being into substantial discourse, the study traversed the history of surveillance and analyzed the normative structure of Article IV of Fund Agreement, monetary sovereignty, principles, procedures, and practices of surveillance currently. Furthermore, it is spelt out that the meaning of consultation under surveillance in international dispute settlement perspective.