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來源文獻資料
摘要
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
風險趨避下英美訴訟制度之比較分析
書刊名:
東吳經濟商學學報
作者:
何志欽
/
洪萌馡
作者(外文):
Ho, Chih-chin
/
Hung, Meng-fei
出版日期:
2010
卷期:
70
頁次:
頁1-28
主題關鍵詞:
訴訟費用分擔制度
;
美制
;
英制
;
風險趨避
;
Fee shifting rule
;
American rule
;
English rule
;
Risk aversion
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:0
共同引用:
3
點閱:22
自Shavell (1982)以來,有關訴訟的文獻大多主張,與美制(American rule,即訴訟兩造各自負擔訴訟費)相較,英制(English rule,即訴訟敗方負責兩造的訴訟費用)鼓勵高價值而抑制低價值訴訟案件的發生。一個有價值的案件是指對原告而言,其勝訴機率很高的案件。但文獻的討論大多數建立在風險中立的假設下,本文則提出風險趨避行為有可能使上述此一主張不成立:當風險趨避程度顯著時,英制較美制更加抑制訴訟案件,許多價值高的案件只在美制下提出。此外,美制雖然產生過多的訴訟案件,但相較英制,可降低訴訟當事人的風險損失。因此就社會鼓勵高價值案件及降低訴訟當事人風險損失的觀點而言,美制優於英制。
以文找文
Most literature, including Shavell (1982), demonstrate that the English rule (the losing side bears all costs) encourages people to file high merit suit and discourages low merit suit while comparing to the the American rule (each side bears its own costs). The high merit lawsuit is regarded as the case with high probability of prevailing. However, this conclusion is yielded based on the assumption of risk neutral. Therefore, there is a gap about whether it can still stand when players' risk attitude is considered. This paper shows that when the players are very risk averse, the discouragement of meritorious suits is greater under the English rule than under the American rule. Some high merit suits are filed only under the American rule. Besides, litigants are worse off in bearing risk under the English rule than under the American rule. Therefore, this paper claims that the American rule is better than the English rule in encouraging meritorious suits and reducing the litigant's risk loss.
以文找文
期刊論文
1.
Shavell, Steven(1982)。Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs。Journal of Legal Studies,11(1),55-81。
2.
古慧雯(19910600)。訴訟費用分攤問題:英美制度之比較。經濟論文叢刊,19(2),197-218。
延伸查詢
3.
Rosenberg, D.、Shavell, S.(1985)。A Model In Which Suits Are Brought For Their Nuisance Value。International Review of Law and Economics,5(1),3-13。
4.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye(1984)。“Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information.”。The RAND Journal of Economics,15,no.3,404-415。
5.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Howard F. Chang(1996)。“An Analysis of Fee-shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11.”。The Journal of Legal Studies,25,no.2,371-403。
6.
Braeutigam, R., Bruce Owen, and John Panzar(1984)。“An Economic Analysis of Alternative Feeshifting Systems.”。Law and Contemporary Problems,47,no.1,173-185。
7.
Chen, Kong-Pin, and Jue-Shyan Wang(2006)。“Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency Fees.”。The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,23,no.3,519-546。
8.
Farmer, Amy, and Paul Pecorino(2007)。“Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model.”。Southern Economic Journal,74,no.2,434-447。
9.
Gould, John P.(1973)。“The Economics of Legal Conflict.”。The Journal of Legal Studies,2,no.2,279-300。
10.
Hause, John C.(1989)。“Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You.”。The Journal of Legal Studies,18,no.1,157-179。
11.
Hughes, James W., and Edward A. Snyder(1995)。“Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence.”。Journal of Law and Economics,38,no.1,225-250。
12.
Hylton, K.N.(1993)。“Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation,”。The Journal of Legal Studies,22,no.1,187-210。
13.
Hylton, K.N.(1993)。“Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard,”。The Journal of Legal Studies,22,no.2,457-476。
14.
Landes, William(1971)。“An Economic Analysis of the Court.”。Journal of Law and Economics,14,61-107。
15.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld(1998)。“Does the English Rule Discourage Low- Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs? ”。The Journal of Legal Studies,27,no.1,141-157。
16.
Rosenberg, D., and Steven Shavell(1985)。“A Model InWhich Suits Are Brought For Their Nuisance Value.”。International Review of Law and Economics,5,no.1,3-13。
17.
Shavell, Steven(1982)。“Suit, Settlement, and Trail: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Me thods for the Allocation of Legal Costs.”。The Journal of Legal Studies,11,no.1,55-81。
18.
Subrahmanyam, Marti G., and Stavros B. Thomadakis(1980)。“Systematic Risk and the Theory of the Firm.”。Quarterly Journal of Economics,94,no.3,437-451。
19.
Subrahmanyam, Marti G.、Thomadakis, Stavros B.(1980)。Systematic Risk and the Theory of the Firm。Quarterly Journal of Economics,94(3),437-451。
20.
Gould, John P.(1973)。The Economics of Legal Conflict。The Journal of Legal Studies,2(2),279-300。
21.
Hause, John C.(1989)。Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You.。The Journal of Legal Studies,18(1),157-179。
22.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye(1984)。Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information。The RAND Journal of Economics,15(3),404-415。
23.
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye、Chang, Howard F.(1996)。An Analysis of Free-shifting Based on the Marhin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11.。The Journal of Legal Studies,25(2),371-403。
24.
Braeutigam, R.、Owen, Bruce、Panzer, John(1984)。An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee-shifting Systems。Law and Contemporary Problems,47(1),137-185。
25.
Chen, Kong-Pin、Wang, Jue-Shyan(2006)。Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency Fees。The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,23(3),519-546。
26.
Farmer, Amy、Pecorino, Paul(2007)。Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model。Southern Economic Journal,74(2),434-447。
27.
Hughes, James W.、Snyder, Edward A.(1995)。Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence。Journal of Law and Economics,38(1),225-250。
28.
Hylton, K. N.(1993)。Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation。The Journal of Legal Studies,22(1),187-210。
29.
Hylton, K. N.(1993)。Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard。The Journal of Legal Studies,22(2),457-476。
30.
Landes, William(1971)。An Economic Analysis of the Court。Journal of Law and Economics,14,61-107。
31.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell、Rubinfeld, Daniel L.(1998)。Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?。The Journal of Legal Studies,27(1),141-157。
圖書
1.
Posner, Richard A.(1977)。Economic Analysis of Law。Boston, Massachusetts:Little, Brown and Company。
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