本文旨在探討影響源自德國的「法律保留」思想之形成及發展的制度關聯要素因素，思考焦點所在，乃憲政體制架構與制度因素如何牽引或影響了法律保留思想發展的方向、內涵與效力。本文認為，法律保留思想與制度之確立，並非憲政國家必然之發展，毋寧取決於權力分立制度下國會之地位與功能，以及關於固有之規範制定權的分配與控制之制度設計，並與憲法基本權之保障體系密不可分。今日德國的法律保留學說與發展現況，從十九世紀形成之初的干預保留，一直發展到今天的以重要性理論為依據的國會保留，實有兩大制度關聯要素：其一是基本法所確立的以國會立法為核心的閉鎖的合法性體系以及高度受限的委任立法權；其次是基本權客觀法規範理論的形成與擴展，致使法律愈益成為形塑基本權權利面貌所不可或缺的前提條件。以台灣今日的憲政體制與基本權保障體系觀之，此兩大關連制度之展現情形，實與德國之情形有相當大本質之差異，因此，以國會立法為國家權力運作中心的法律保留思想之制度面發展，其所植基之憲法與法學根基、正當性及其限制，恐難直接取法於德國法理之相關成就，而有重構法律保留理論基礎與制度內涵之必要。

This article aims at examining the related institutional factors of the formation and development of the “requirement of a specifically enacted statute” (“Vorbehalt des Gesetzes”), a concept that is originally from Germany. The focus of this paper is on how the constitutional structure and institutional factors affect the development, contents, and efficacy of the “requirement of a specifically enacted statute.” This article finds that the development of a constitutional state does not necessarily lead to the establishment of the “requirement of a specifically enacted statute.” Instead, it is the status and function of Parliament under the separation of powers system as well as the institutional construction of the distribution and control of the original rule-making power that contributes to this establishment. It is also closely intertwined with the framework of the constitutional rights protection. Emerging from the “requirement of an enacted statute for state’s interference” (“Eingriffsvorbehalt”), which was formed in early nineteen century, to the “requirement of parliamentary approval” (“Parlamentsvorbehalt”), which is based on the essentiality theory, the development of the “principle of legal reservation” today owes to two institutional factors. One is, established by the Basic Law, the closed legality system composed of the parliamentary legislation and the highly restricted delegated legislation, and the other is the forming and the expansion of the theory of “basic rights as objective norms,” that makes statutes become an indispensable premise in shaping the basic rights. It appears that the constitutional structure and basic rights protection system in Taiwan at present are largely different from those in Germany in nature. This makes it hard for the development of “requirement of a specifically enacted statute,” which is based on constitution, jurisprudence, legitimacy and restriction, to emulate Germany directly. Therefore, this article argues that there is a need to restructure the foundation and the contents of the theory basis of the “requirement of a specifically enacted statute” in Taiwan.