本文主要探討公司法制中有關股東權益的保障功能對於企業併購市場的影響，利用La Porta、Lopez-de-Silanes、Shleifer和Vishny四位學者（以下簡稱LLSV）在Law and Finance論文中所設計的股東對抗董事會之異議權指標（anti-director rights index, ADRI）做為實證研究的基礎。透過文獻探討與實證分析，希冀於資本市場中有關併購活動之議題上，可供吾人了解少數股東權利於併購活動下運作的實質效果與促進市場活絡之可能性。本研究首先討論LLSV在公司法學上研究的特色─以實證方法評價各法系與國家的公司法制，以及此方法可能的缺失及所招致之批評。其次，本文利用哈佛法學院研究人員修正LLSV的方法（哈佛修正版），運用財務學方法分析近年各國併購交易的數據，探討購併與股東異議權各項指標的關連性及此關連性在法律上之價值。本實證分析的結果是六種股東異議權對併購的影響不一：一項正相關、一項負相關、三項無顯著關連性、一項不具決定性（定義有重大疑義）。故可以看出法律規範量化的重要價值，值得主管機關參考及供後續深入探究。

This paper mainly discusses the effect of minority shareholder protection on markets of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We use the index of anti-director rights (ADRI) developed by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (LLSV) in their Law and Finance article to be our methodological core. The purpose is to show whether minority shareholder protection is workable in M&A activities, and whether it can facilitate M&A markets.To begin with, this paper discusses LLSV's uniqueness in corporate law study--using empirical method to value legal origins and corporate law structures around the world. Then, this paper analyzes LLSV's possible defects and reviews criticisms it has incurred. Second, this paper uses a revised LLSV methodology developed by a Harvard Law School researcher, with financial quantitative analysis, to examine global M&A deals, hoping that the result may show some relevance between of ADRI and M&A activities, and the legal value of this relevance.This paper finds that each of six anti-director rights has different relevance to M&A activities: one is positive, one is negative, three are insignificant, and one is inconclusive (material definition defect). Thus we may see the importance of law quantification. We appreciate further research and authorities' consideration following our work in Taiwan.