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題名:非協調合作與通貨膨脹契約
書刊名:經濟研究. 臺北大學經濟學系
作者:江秀燕
作者(外文):Chiang, Hsiu-yen
出版日期:2011
卷期:47:2
頁次:頁225-263
主題關鍵詞:工會通貨膨脹非協調合作UnionInflationNon-coordination
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:140
本文藉由財政當局與工會採行非協調合作的方式,來檢視時序不一致的議題。本文發現央行官員提高對通膨的偏好權數,會降低社會福利水準。然而,當財政當局提高對政府支出比率的偏好權數,以及工會提高對通膨的偏好權數,社會福利水準卻會提升。 另外,本文發現通膨與產出波動彼此無抵換關係。再者,央行官員對通膨的趨避程度不會引起通膨與產出波動,此結果不同於Rogoff 的命題。
This paper examines the time inconsistency issues by means of non-coordinated fiscal authority and union. It is found that a rise in the weight assigned to inflation by the central banker depresses the social welfare. However, the social welfare can be enhanced if (i) the fiscal authority raises the weight assigned to the government spending ratio; or (ii) the union raises its concern about inflation. It is also found that there is no policy trade-off between the inflation and output stability. Moreover, in contrast to Rogoff’s Proposition, we find that the inflation aversion of the central banker plays no role in the inflation or output fluctuations.
期刊論文
1.Lawler, P.(2007)。Strategic Wage Setting, Inflation Uncertainty and Optimal Delegation。European Journal of Political Economy,23(4),1105-1118。  new window
2.Oswald, A. J.(1985)。The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey。Scandinavian Journal of Economics,87(2),160-193。  new window
3.Barro, R. J.、Gordon, D. B.(1983)。Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy。Journal of Monetary Economics,12(1),101-121。  new window
4.Lawler, P.(2005)。Central Bank Inflation Contracts and Strategic Wage Setting in a Multiunion Economy。Economics Letters,86(3),323-329。  new window
5.Cubitt, R. P.(1992)。Monetary Policy Games and Private Sector Precommitment。Oxford Economic Papers,44(3),513-530。  new window
6.Barro, R. J.、Gordon, D. B.(1983)。A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model。The Journal of Political Economy,91(4),589-610。  new window
7.Kydland, F. E.、Prescott, E. C.(1977)。Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans。Journal Political Economy,85(3),473-493。  new window
8.Rogoff, Kenneth(1985)。The Optimal Degree of Commitment to An Intermediate Monetary Target。Quarterly Journal of Economics,100(4),1169-1190。  new window
9.Walsh, Carl E.(1995)。Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers。American Economic Review,85(1),150-167。  new window
10.Acocella, N.、Bartolomeo, G. Di、Tirelli, P.(2007)。Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Coordination in a Monetary Union。Economics Letters,94(1),56-63。  new window
11.Acocella, N.、Bartolomeo, G. Di、Tirelli, P.(2009)。The Macroeconomics of Social Pacts。Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,72(1),202-213。  new window
12.Alesina, A.、Tabellini, G.(1987)。Rules and Discretion with Non-Coordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies。Economic Inquiry,25(4),619-630。  new window
13.Backus, D. K.、Driffill, E. J.(1985)。Inflation and Reputation。American Economic Review,75(3),530-538。  new window
14.Acocella, N.、Bartolomeo, G. Di(2004)。Non-Neutrality of Monetary Policy in Policy Game。European Journal of Political Economy,20(3),695-707。  new window
15.Calmfors, L.、Driffill, E. J.(1988)。Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance。Economic Policy,3(6),14-61。  new window
16.Cubitt, R. P.(1995)。Corporatism, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis。Scandinavian Journal of Economics,97(2),245-259。  new window
17.James, J. G.、Lawler, P.(2006)。Might a Conservative Central Banker Reduce Employment Variability?。Economics Letters,93(3),367-373。  new window
18.James, J. G.、Lawler, P.(2007)。Supply Shocks, Private Sector Information and Monetary Policy: Is There Inevitably a Stabilization Trade-off?。Economics Letters,96(1),77-83。  new window
19.Lawler, P.(2000)。Union Wage Setting and Exchange Rate Policy。Economica,67(265),91-100。  new window
20.Lawler, P.(2000)。Centralized Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker。The Economic Journal,110(463),559-575。  new window
21.Lawler, P.(2001)。Monetary Policy。Central Bank Objectives,53(1),94-113。  new window
22.Lawler, P.(2002)。Monetary Uncertainty。Strategic Wage Setting and Equilibrium Employment,77(1),35-40。  new window
23.Skott, P.(1997)。Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized Economy。Oxford Economic Papers,49(4),609-622。  new window
24.Turnovsky, S. J.(1987)。Optimal Monetary Policy and Wage Indexation under Alternative Disturbances and Information Structure。Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,19(2),157-180。  new window
25.Weymark, D. N.(2007)。Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence。European Economic Review,51(2),297-315。  new window
圖書
1.Persson, T.、Tabellini, G.(1990)。Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics。Harwood Academic Publishers。  new window
2.Cukierman, A.(2004)。Monetary Institutions, Monetary Union and Unionized Labor Markets-Some Recent Developments。Monetary Policy, Financial Policies and Labor Markets: Key Aspets of Macroeconomic Policy Making in EMU。Cambridge。  new window
3.Tarantelli, E.(1986)。The Regulation of Inflation and Unemployment Industrial Relations。Economic Models of Trade Union。London。  new window
 
 
 
 
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