摘 要 本文旨在探討當代儒家在位格理論上所提出的「儒家現實擁有判準」 理論及「等差之愛」原則，以及它們對於人類胚胎的觀點。「儒家現實擁有 判準」（Confucian actual-possession criteria）是區別位格（person）與非位格 （non-person）的一種理論，該理論及由之衍生出來的「儒家位格漸進論」 （Confucian gradualism）、「儒家社會性位格論」（Confucian social personhood） 是本文首先要加以探討的幾個儒家位格理論，這些理論對於人該如何看待人 類胚胎乃至如何看待人提出了非常具爭議性而值得探討的看法。其次，本文 進一步要探討訴諸儒家「等差之愛」原則以證立「為了醫學進步及人類福祉 的理由而許可傷害人類胚胎」的主張。 本文主張，無論「儒家現實擁有判準」、「儒家位格漸進論」或「儒家 社會性位格論」等概念，都無法從儒家思想中推導出來，而且也與儒家思 想互不相容。至於以儒家「等差之愛」原則來證立犧牲胚胎的作法，不僅 證據薄弱，從「不傷害」（first, do no harm）原則的角度來看，更是站不住 腳的。

Abstract The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind. I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.