本文結合了不完全訊息並同時以廠商利潤、社會福利為指標，重新探討 VER的政策意涵及出口國是否自願執行的問題。發現在進口國對出口國訊息不完全之情形下，若為 Cournot競爭， VER將對兩國產生實質的影響：對出口國而言，不論其廠商為何種類型，此時的 VER政策都是非自願的；進口國的福利變化則需視出口廠商之類型而定。 Bertrand競爭下， VER只在出口廠商為高成本類型時方對出口國有利，且不論出口國廠商為何種類型，VER皆無法使兩國同時獲利。

The policy implications of voluntary export restraints are examined under incomplete information. When firms engage in Cournot competition under incomplete information of foreign technologies, voluntary export restraints are involuntary for the exporting country, while domestic welfare will depend on the type of foreign firms. Under Bertrand competition, voluntary export restraints are voluntary for the exporting country when its firms are of a high cost type, however, they cannot increase the welfare of both countries.