我們由國家社會制度以及個人生活行動的角度此二切入點，來分析公民如何得以作為真正的平權道德主體這個問題，容易推得的一項結論是，平權的主體之可能，勢必仰賴公民承認彼此自由又平等的能力。承認彼此自由又平等的能力此項初步必要的條件既然如此重要，公共政策的設計或施行者，以及公民負擔的責任，又應該怎樣劃分與界定，才能夠促成它的實現？本文首先將討論與提出一項論證說明：當代英美分配正義理論關於「甚麼的平等」（"equality of what"）問題脈絡論辯中，基於「能力」（capability）的平等衡量項之目標設定，相較於其它選項，因為直接促成個人承認能力的實行及其他理由，而為本文倡議的平權制度選項。其次，透過概念分析的方式，本文為平權公民負有的個人行動責任，亦即，如何互相承認彼此自由又平等，提供「能力」進路允許的規範性說明。

If we search for the ways citizens can be moral agents bearing with genuine equal rights from the vantage points of the institution and the individual citizen, an immediate result is this: the very possibility of moral agents bearing with genuine equal rights must be determined by the capacity individuals recognizing each others as free and equal. Since the capacity plays such a key role in realizing genuine equal rights for all, what exactly should institutions and individuals take the capacity be, so that it also provides an account specifying reasonable and distinguished responsibilities for institutions and individuals? This article is to facilitate two aims in responding to the question. First, accepting Nancy Fraser's integrating ideal orientating for both redistribution and recognition, I argue that, comparably, due to its necessary, efficient and direct effect in promoting and substantiating the capacity recognizing each other as free and equal, 'the capability approach,' first introduced by Amartya Sen, in the debate 'Equality of What' should be the chosen theory in governing the institutional design. Second, some normative aspects for individuals realizing genuine equal rights are also made clear.