本文以分配政治理論為基礎，觀察立法委員在複數選區單記非讓渡選舉制度時期（SNTV制度，第二屆至第六屆立法院期間），立法委員選區內提出環保訴願的民營企業所獲得的訴願決定是否受到立法委員的政治力影響？由於 SNTV制度下的立法委員會藉由積極建立和經營個人票倉區以獲得過門檻的票數來維持競爭優勢。所以，本論文特別關心提出環保訴願的企業是否會因為座落地點位於立法委員的票倉區內而獲得有利的訴願決定？
多變量邏輯斯迴歸分析發現，第一，立委 SNTV選舉制度所衍生的票倉區現象對於立委肉桶行為產生影響。不管我們是以提出訴願的企業座落地「是否位於立委的票倉區」或是依照票倉區內立委人數規模將票倉區分為「零位」、「一位」或「兩位及兩位以上」，只要提出訴願的企業座落於立委的票倉區內時，該企業獲得訴願撤銷的機會將大於不是座落於立委票倉區內的企業。第二，票倉區立委人數規模的差異也會影響立委肉桶行為的強度。如果企業座落在僅有一位立委的票倉區，那麼他們獲得撤銷處分的機會更會大過於座落在兩位以及兩位以上立委票倉區的企業。第三、國會制度性權力對於環保訴願決定的影響不明顯。第四，不同的原因決定票倉區立委協助污染企業的動機。座落於票倉區內提出訴願的企業如果員工數越多、企業成立時間越短，則這些企業獲得撤銷裁決的機會比員工數少的企業或歷史悠久的企業較大。另外，沒有企業經營背景的立委比有企業背景的立委更傾向於協助其票倉區內的污染企業。第五，就時間上來說，第四屆與第五屆立院期間的撤銷比例相對於其他屆次來說明顯較高。歸結來說，立法委員會協助他們的票倉區內有污染事實的民營企業，而使這些企業免除或減輕因為污染環境所遭受的行政處分。環保訴願決定似乎成為討好企業的肉桶工具，因而使得環保管制政策具有分配政治的特質。

This thesis explores the distributive attributes of regulatory policies in Taiwan. Generally speaking, if polluting industries are penalized by local EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) but remain unconvinced, industries may file an administrative appeal to the EPA of central government for remedies. The EPA of central government shall organize a committee to review cases and then decide either to dismiss the case or to keep the status quo in terms of necessary evidences. Based on the 365 cases of administrative appeal which have been filed by private-owned industries from 1993 to 2007, the authors ask whether the decisions of central government EPA are contaminated by distributive politics. Specifically we ask, under what conditions and to what extent, do legislators who are elected from the industries’ location try to affect the decision so that the polluting industries might be better off (the case end up with dismissal)? Special attention is paid on how the SNTV system shapes legislators’ motives to serve polluting industries’ interest.
Logistic regression is employed to estimate the factors that would affect the results of appeal. First of all, the results show that legislators do help the appealing industries, which located in legislators’ vote-concentrated area, to get better appealing results, in the sense that legislator treats regulatory policy as the pork barrel to please the industries. Second, if only one legislator dominates the sub-district (vote-concentrated area) where the industries are located, then the appealing result is better than other appealing industries whose location either without any legislator’s dominance or with more than one’s dominance. Third, there are still some significant factors contributing to the appealing results such as the business background of legislators, operation duration and the amount of workers of appealing company etc..
In sum, this thesis not only indicates that the regulatory policy has distributive attributes, but also reveals that the legislators’ pork-barrel behavior is mostly affected by the sub-district where legislators’ votes are concentrated. These findings have some implications on distributive politics under the SNTV system in Taiwan.