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題名:納入延遲策略下的政府環境誘因管制分析
書刊名:應用經濟論叢
作者:翁仁甫 引用關係梁雅婷
作者(外文):Ueng, Zen-fuLiang, Ya-ting
出版日期:2012
卷期:91
頁次:頁197-221
主題關鍵詞:環境誘因管制延遲誘因理論當事-代理模型Environmental incentive regulationDelayIncentive theoryPrincipal-agent model
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:16
鑒於過往關於資訊不對稱下的環境管制分析,皆未將環境管制當局可採取延遲 (delay) 策略,做為管制政策工具的可能性納入討論的範圍。本研究擬擴展Boyer and Laffont (1999) 的當事-代理 (principal-agent) 環境管制分析架構,將政府環境管制當局可 以採取延遲策略,做為其環境誘因管制 (environmental incentive regulation) 工具的可能性 納入考慮,建構一個考慮延遲策略的環境誘因管制模型,進行政府環境誘因管制措施的 福利與經濟影響效果分析,我們除了將探究政府環境管制當局在何種情況下,可以藉由 採取延遲策略來達成提升社會福利水準的目的外,亦將針對受管制廠商之國籍別(本國 或外國籍),對於資訊不對稱下政府最適環境管制措施的可能影響提出說明。
The past environmental regulation analyses under asymmetric information often disregard the possibility that environmental regulatory authorities may take the delay strategy as regulatory policy tool. This research will construct a model of environmental incentive regulation with delay by expanding the model of Boyer and Laffont (1999). Using our structure, we engage in economy and welfare effect analysis of environmental incentive regulation measures. We explore the condition that the regulation delay can improve social welfare. In addition, we explain the potential influence of the nationality of firm on governmental environmental regulation measures.
期刊論文
1.Weitzman, Martin L.(1974)。Prices vs. Quantities。The Review of Economic Studies,41(4),477-491。  new window
2.Ueng, Z. F.、Yang, C. C.(2005)。Time Delay and the Extraction of Information Rent in Regulation。Journal of Economics,84(1),1-26。  new window
3.Baron, D. P.、Myerson, R.(1982)。Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs。Econometrica,50(4),911-930。  new window
4.Maskin, E.、Riley, J.(1984)。Monopoly with incomplete information。The Rand Journal of Economics,15(2),171-196。  new window
5.Mirrlees, James Alexander(1971)。An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation。The Review of Economic Studies,38(2),175-208。  new window
6.Ueng, Z. F.、Yang, C. C.(2005)。Extracting Consumer Information Rent by Delaying the Delivery of Goods/Services。Economics Letters,87,103-108。  new window
7.翁仁甫(2007)。政府當局公共財貨提供時點的延遲與社會福利-供給面分析。經濟研究,43,129-148。new window  延伸查詢new window
8.Adar, Z.、Griffin, J. M.(1976)。Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control Instruments。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,3,178-188。  new window
9.Baron, D. P.(1985)。Regulation of Prices and Pollution under Incomplete Information。Journal of Public Economics,28,211-231。  new window
10.Baron, D. P.(1985)。Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality。Rand Journal of Economics,16,553-568。  new window
11.Boyer, M.、Laffont, J. J.(1999)。Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation。Journal of Economics,30,137-157。  new window
12.Cropper, M.、Oates, W.(1992)。Environmental Economics。A Survey,30,675-740。  new window
13.Fishelson, G.(1976)。Emission Control Policies under Uncertainty。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,3,189-197。  new window
14.Lewis, T. R.(1996)。Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits are Privately Known。The Rand Journal of Economics,27,819-847。  new window
15.Roberts, M. J.、Spence, M.(1976)。Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty。Journal of Public Economics,5,193-208。  new window
圖書
1.Laffont, J. J.、Martimort, D.(2002)。Theory of Incentives : The Principal-Agent Model。Princeton:Princeton University Press。  new window
2.Salanié, Bernard(1997)。The Economics of Contracts: A Primer。Cambridge, MA:MIT Press。  new window
3.Segerson, K.(1996)。Issues in the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments。Environmental Policy with Political and Economic Integration: The European Union and the United States \\ Braden, J. B. ; Folmer, H. ; Ulen, T. S. (ed.)。Brookfield。  new window
4.Laffont, J. J.(1994)。Regulation of Pollution with Asymmetric Information。Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis \\ Dosi, C. ; Tomasi, T. (ed.)。Dordrecht。  new window
5.Laffont, J. J.(2000)。Incentive and Political Economy。New York。  new window
6.Laffont, J. J.、Tirole, J.(1993)。Theory of Incentive in Procurement and Regulation。Cambridge。  new window
其他
1.Vislie, J.(2001)。Environmental Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Foreign Ownership。  new window
 
 
 
 
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