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題名:The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason
書刊名:國立臺灣大學哲學論評
作者:何志青 引用關係
作者(外文):Ho, Jih-ching
出版日期:2012
卷期:44
頁次:頁73-101
主題關鍵詞:理由動機內在論外在論ReasonMotivationInternalismExternalism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連,內在論主張行動理由與動機事實有必要之聯結,外在論則否認。1980年,威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”,提出反對外在論的強力論證,引發了倫理學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後,他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”(2001),精進他的休謨理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢;更重要的是,他將過去二十多年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路:「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」,並且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發展,其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述,以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最新論點不足以反駁此二進路。
A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason. Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly, he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups, “the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches, primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell, and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the two approaches.
期刊論文
1.Watson, Gary(19750424)。Free Agency。The Journal of Philosophy,72(8),220。  new window
2.Korsgaard, Christine M.(1986)。Skepticism about Practical Reason。The Journal of Philosophy,83(1),5-26。  new window
3.Millgram, E.(1996)。Williams’ Argument against External Reasons。Nous,30,197-220。  new window
圖書
1.Korsgaard, Christine M.(2009)。Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
2.Hume, David、Selby-Bigge, L. A.、Nidditch, P. H.(1978)。A Treatise of Human Nature。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
3.Damasio, A. R.(1994)。Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain。New York:Grosset。  new window
4.Gazzaniga, M. S.(2008)。Human: The science behind what makes us unique。New York:Harper Collins。  new window
5.James, W.(1956)。The Will to Believe, Human Immortality, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy。New York:Dover Publications。  new window
6.Millgram, Elijah(2001)。Varieties of Practical Reasoning。Cambridge:MIT Press。  new window
7.Setiya, K.(2007)。Reasons without Rationalism。Princeton:Princeton University Press。  new window
圖書論文
1.McDowell, J.(1998)。Might There be External Reasons?。World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams。Cambridge:Harvard University Press。  new window
2.Williams, Bernard A. O.(1981)。Internal and External Reasons。Moral Luck。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
3.Williams, B.(2001)。Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons。Varieties of Practical Reasoning。Cambridge:The MIT Press。  new window
4.Finlay, S.、Schroeder, M.(2008)。Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External。Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy。  new window
5.McDowell, J.(2006)。Reply to Philip Pettit and Michael Smith。McDowell and His Critics。Oxford:Blackwell Publishing。  new window
 
 
 
 
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