本研究選取1994 年至2009 年間，跨越五國共計74 家合作銀行，配合混合 資料迴歸模型，試圖探討盈餘管理與市場競爭對合作銀行風險承擔之關聯性。 實證發現合作銀行高階經理人若進行盈餘管理會提高銀行的破產風險。而且合 作銀行的市占率越高，合作銀行將更加穩定。我們還發現盈餘管理與市場競爭 對合作銀行風險存在負向關係，表示處於較低競爭市場之合作銀行，高階經理 人越不會進行盈餘管理。原因在於處於較低競爭市場之合作銀行，已經有排擠 掉其他商業銀行市場空間的傾向，因此高階經理人無須再進行盈餘管理來掩蓋 相關資訊。

The study examines the relationship between earnings management, competition and risk by using a panel data of 74 cooperative banks for 5 countries during the 1994-2009 periods. The results show that earnings management has a negative effect on risk, indicating that bank managers’ manipulation of earnings will raise the probability of bank failures. Competition has a positive effect on risk, showing that a higher cooperative bank presence means less space for commercial banks in the loan market (retail market). We also find that earnings management and competition are negatively related, the evidence supports that bank managers will have less incentive tomanipulate earnings if cooperative banks do not face much competition.