自從浮動油價機制開始實施以來，在雙佔市場環境裡，石油供應商及其通路與對手的競爭出現不尋常的現象。首先，自由交易的石油市場下的雙方會完全掌控所屬的加油站形成靜態的賽局環境。本研究依照實際市場佔有率為賽局的基準，進行報償機制的討論。透過原油價格來回波動的影響，本賽局運用邏輯推理和賽局樹演化過程的方式說明這機制。此賽局由雙方觀點去考量。研究結果發現，在雙佔的石油市場裡，零售商的促銷活動比供應商做促銷所產生的影響來的大。從原始的靜態賽局演化到動態賽局中的模擬結果顯示，在雙方所屬的零售商進行促銷活動時，供應商不需要做任何促銷活動，在長期下可以達到最適合的均衡狀態。供應商僅需要將原油成本反映在價格上。市場佔有率大的一方，只需維持其數量優勢。最終，零售價的產生會由雙方零售商與消費者的價格敏感度之間互動而產生均衡。本研究運用賽局提供雙佔石油市場中供應商與零售商對其產品，進行促銷的最適時機，避免掉入無謂的價格戰，影響了雙方的利益。

This article elucidates the two administrative levels of the oft-discussed issue of duopoly market, concentrating on stances contradiction between wholesaler and retailer with harmony and enmity, were demonstrated in a dynamic game. Based on a comprehensive literature review and practical observation, the scenario between two major petroleum groups in Taiwan has been chosen as subject of fitness for expounding the phenomenon. Initiate contour of the game model has been made of profundity interview with scholars and practitioners in order to information integrity state of the art. Thorough the logically ratiocination and interaction rounds of the game, the recompense mechanism has be deemed to acquiesce as a solution for avert collide between two parties. Therefore, the coopetiton relationship has result in dual-competition reconciled. Otherwise, according the circumstances status quo to vary the stance of roles between wholesaler and retailer were clearly progressively. Adoptive strategy had obviously for utilized to achieve the market equilibrium.