「競爭性自由化」雖是近來揭櫫之政策概念，但是「歐體／歐盟」與「歐洲自由貿易協會」（ European Free Trade Association, EFTA）之間貿易自由化的競爭卻自第二次世界大戰後便已存在。過去研究大多聚焦於歐體／歐盟與美國間的「競爭性自由化」現象，卻鮮少探究歐體／歐盟貿易自由化對 EFTA所造成的競爭壓力，進而促使 EFTA對外洽簽自由貿易協定。本文旨在彌補既有文獻的缺憾，初步探索歐體／歐盟與 EFTA之間貿易自由化的競爭。本文運用 EFTA與第三國長期貿易量的客觀資料，以及 1960年至 2002年 EFTA部長理事會記錄之主觀資料，並建構統計模型，試圖說明歐體／歐盟貿易自由化與 EFTA對外洽簽自由貿易協定的共變相關性。從客觀貿易量資料來看，本文發現 EFTA會員國內部彼此貿易占其總貿易量比例越小，或 EFTA與歐體／歐盟貿易占 EFTA總貿易量比例越大，則 EFTA越可能對外洽簽自由貿易協定。另一方面從 EFTA部長理事會記錄之主觀資料來看， EFTA理事會越強調自由貿易協定相關概念字組，則越容易對外洽簽自由貿易協定。惟此主觀變項在控制 EFTA客觀貿易量變項後就變得統計上不顯著。此外， EFTA理事會越關注其會員國加入歐體／歐盟事宜，則越可能對外洽簽自由貿易協定。本文發現 EFTA主觀上考量是否對外洽簽自由貿易協定，除了因貿易量變化外，亦可能為其組織存續，尋求功能正當性，進而對外洽簽自由貿易協定。惟本文屬初探性質，又因資料母體數目所限，無法控制多項干擾因素，亦未建構細緻的因果模型去呈現歐體／歐盟與 EFTA貿易自由化之雙向競爭，此乃本文之限制。

Competition for trade liberalization is best explained by the concept of “competitive liberalization”. The concept is used to analyze whether the EC/EU’s trade liberalization has affected the decision of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to sign free trade agreements (FTA) with third countries. In order for “competitive liberalization” to be initiated and imitated, we suggest that it is critical for decision-makers to attribute their countries’ lack of competitiveness to the liberalization measures of competitors. At the same time, decision makers must believe that the only way to rectify the situation is to join the competitive race by signing FTAs with trade partners. This being so, not only must objective trade data be used, but the subjective evaluations of decision makers must also be included to verify the competitive liberalization hypothesis. By analyzing covariations of long-term trade data and the 1960-2002 EFTA Council records, we find that the EC/EU’s signing of an FTA increases the likelihood of EFTA signing an FTA. This is the case even when we control for trade variables. Moreover, the data from EFTA Council records suggests that the greater the emphasis that ministers place on FTA “word strings”, the greater the likelihood that the EFTA will sign FTAs with other countries. This effect disappears if we control for trade data. Finally, we find that the more concerned EFTA ministers are with a state’s application for EC/EU membership, the more likely it is that an FTA will be signed. Thus, subjectively speaking, the EFTA ministers’ decision to sign FTAs with other countries may be more complicated than argued by theorists of “competitive liberalization”.