| 期刊論文1. | Cohen, A.、Dehejia, R.(2004)。2004), "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities。Journal of Law and Economics,47,357-393。 | 2. | Abbring, J. H.、Chiappori, P. A.、Pinquet, J.(2003)。Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data。Journal of the European Economic Association,1,767-820。 | 3. | Dionne, Georges、Michaud, Pierre-Carl、Dahchour, Maki(2013)。Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France。Journal of the European Economic Association,11(4),897-917。 | 4. | Dunham, W. R.(2003)。Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles。Review of Industrial Organization,23,65-83。 | 5. | Harris, M.、Raviv, A.(1978)。Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Application to Education and Employment。Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement," The American Economic Review,68,20-30。 | 6. | Li, C. S.、Liu, C. C.(2007)。The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance。Journal of Risk and Insurance,74,441-559。 | 7. | Schneider, H. S.(2010)。Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry。Journal of Law and Economics,53,783-805。 | 8. | Shavell, S.(1979)。On Moral Hazard and Insurance。Quarterly Journal of Economics,93(4),541-562。 | 9. | Holmström, Bengt(1982)。Moral Hazard in Teams。The Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),324-340。 | 10. | Mookherjee, D.、Png, I.(1989)。Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,104,399-415。 | 研究報告1. | Abbring, J. H.、Chiappori, P. A.、Zavadil, T.(2008)。Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data。 | 圖書1. | Ceccarini, O.(2008)。Does Experience Rating Matter in Reducing Accident Probabilities? A Test for Moral Hazard。University of Pennsylvania.。 | 圖書論文1. | Dwight, J.、Russell, T.(1998)。“The Causes and Consequences of Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry。The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance。Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press。 | |