本文根據學者堅田沙織及索莉思的分析架構，以國內層面為主， 解釋臺灣洽簽《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》之歷程。《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》之所以能成功簽署，是因為臺灣企業為避免未簽署其他自由貿易協定所造成的損失，因此不斷推動政府進行《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》談判。另一方面，本文假定以避免損失為主軸的貿易政策較易讓民眾接受，而《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》早收清單由於訴求能夠降低其他自由貿易協定對臺灣所造成的威脅，所以較易得到民眾支持。

This paper investigates Taiwan’s participation in regionalism, in particular the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), from the perspective of political economics. Following Putman’s “twolevel game” and Katada and Solis’s analytic framework, this paper explains the transformation of Taiwan’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) policy. The author argues that the success in signing the ECFA is the result of pressure from the ASEAN-China FTA on private companies. In order to avoid losses caused by the absence of an FTA, some Taiwanese industries pressured the government to negotiate an ECFA. This paper also assumes that trade policy activated by loss avoidance is more acceptable for the general public. Since an ECFA can deflect the threat of ASEAN regionalism, people would be more prone to accept it. This is what led to the successful signing of the ECFA.