資料載入處理中...
臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統
:::
網站導覽
國圖首頁
聯絡我們
操作說明
English
行動版
(52.15.193.173)
登入
字型:
**字體大小變更功能,需開啟瀏覽器的JAVASCRIPT,如您的瀏覽器不支援,
IE6請利用鍵盤按住ALT鍵 + V → X → (G)最大(L)較大(M)中(S)較小(A)小,來選擇適合您的文字大小,
如為IE7以上、Firefoxy或Chrome瀏覽器則可利用鍵盤 Ctrl + (+)放大 (-)縮小來改變字型大小。
來源文獻查詢
引文查詢
瀏覽查詢
作者權威檔
引用/點閱統計
我的研究室
資料庫說明
相關網站
來源文獻查詢
/
簡易查詢
/
查詢結果列表
/
詳目列表
:::
詳目顯示
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆
/1
頁
來源文獻資料
摘要
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
亞里斯多德論知覺:物質論或精神論?
書刊名:
東吳哲學學報
作者:
王志輝
作者(外文):
Wang, Zhi-hue
出版日期:
2015
卷期:
32
頁次:
頁37-86
主題關鍵詞:
知覺
;
物質論
;
精神論
;
潛能
;
實現
;
Perception
;
Materialism
;
Spiritualism
;
Dunamis
;
Energeia
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(
2
) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:
2
共同引用:0
點閱:23
在近數十年來,有關亞里斯多德知覺理論的研究,環繞在一個關鍵爭議上。R. Sorabji認為,根據亞里斯多德,知覺乃是建立在某種「典型變化」的基礎上,亦即當我們在知覺時,知覺器官乃是如實地接受知覺形式、物理性地歷經的性質變動,例如在看到紅色時,我們的眼球也必須變成紅色。反之,M. Burnyeat則援引Aquinas的亞里斯多德知覺理論詮釋,認為知覺乃是一種純粹「精神性的變化」;這種精神性的變化,Burnyeat認為,與器官典型的性質變化一點關係都沒有,也無須底層的物理或材質變化為其生理基礎;因為我們當知覺時,知覺器官僅是覺察到知覺形式,而非物理上如實地接受它們。針對這個爭議,本文試圖採取一種折衷的詮釋立場。本文並不認為,知覺活動等同於或承載在知覺器官的典型性質變化之上。然而,本文亦不認為,知覺活動與器官之生理或物理變化絲毫無關,如Burnyeat所設想的那樣。延續近年來流行的「編碼說」的詮釋立場,本文嘗試論證,在知覺活動中,知覺器官雖未歷經典型的性質變化,但它仍然歷經某種材質性的變動,而知覺形式則正是被「編碼」在這種變動之中。然而,相較於近年流行的各種「編碼說」立場多半忽略了,被編碼的變動仍然是某種材質性或生理性的變動這個事實,也未注意到這個事實對亞里斯多德整體知覺理論乃是某種潛在的威脅,本文嘗試指出,亞里斯多德的「知覺作為中道」說法,恰好可解決這個困難。
以文找文
In recent decades, scholarly researches on Aristotle's theory of perception focused on a central debate concerning the role which the physiological process plays in perception. On the one hand, R. Sorabji claimed that perceiving, on Aristotle's view, involves a physiological process in which the sense-organ literally takes on the perceptible quality of the object. That is, perception has the "standard alteration" (change of quality) of the sense-organ as its physiological basis. For example, when we see a red apple, the organ of sight (the eye-jelly) should be physically turning into red. In contrast, M. Burnyeat suggested that perception is purely a "spiritual change" (to use Aquinas' term), which has nothing to do with the standard alteration suggested by Sorabji. Moreover, Burnyeat insisted that there is definitely no physiological or material change taking place during perception, because perceiving, as a pure spiritual activity, does not require any underlying material process as its physiological basis. Hence, on Burnyeat's reading, the physiological process has no role to play in perception. This article attempts to find a proper balance between these two radically contrasting interpretations. First, I will show that there is no clear evidence in Aristotle's text to claim that the physiological process involved in perceiving is the organ's literally taking on the perceptible form, as Sorabji suggested. Second, I will prove that Burnyeat's position is not totally persuasive either. For it is not the case that perception has nothing to do with any physiological or material process taking place in the sense-organ. Following the interpreting line recently suggested by several structuralist approaches, I try to argue that although the sense-organ does not bear a standard change of quality during perception, it is nevertheless affected by an "encoded" movement induced by a likewise encoded movement of the medium. In this way, the sense-organ will receive only a coded message, without really exemplifying the perceived quality. However, since the organ's reception of the coded message is still supposed to be a physiological change, it would be very difficult to explain how perceiving can be grounded in such a process; for one of the main theses in Aristotle's theory of perception is that perceiving is an "activity" (energeia), which should not be constructed by any physiological or material change whatsoever underlying it. This dilemma, I think, can be evaded by appealing to a famous proverb in De Anima that "perception is a mean."
以文找文
期刊論文
1.
Shields, Christopher(1988)。Soul and Body in Aristotle。Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,6,103-137。
2.
Sisko, J. E.(1996)。Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle’s De Anima。Phronesis,41,138-157。
3.
Barker, Andrew(1981)。Aristotle on Perception and Ratios。Phronesis,26,248-266。
4.
Bradshaw, D.(1997)。Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory。Apeiron,30,143-161。
5.
Brennan, S. O.(1973)。Sensing and the Sensitive Mean in Aristotle。The New Scholasticism,47,279-310。
6.
Broadie, S.(1993)。Aristotle’s Perceptual Realism。The Southern Journal of Philosophy,31,137-159。
7.
Burnyeat, M. F.(1995)。How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?。De Anima,2,7-8。
8.
Burnyeat, Myles F.(2002)。De Anima II 5。Phronesis,47(1),28-90。
9.
Bynum, T. W.(1987)。A New Look at Aristotle’s Theory of Perception。History of Philosophy Quarterly,4,163-178。
10.
Caston, V.(1998)。Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,58,249-298。
11.
Ebert, T.(1983)。Aristotle on What is Done in Perceiving。Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,37,181-198。
12.
Glidden, D.(1984)。Aristotelian Perception and the Hellenistic Problem of Representation。Ancient Philosophy,4,119-131。
13.
Kosman, L. A.(1984)。Substance, Being and Energeia。Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,2,121-149。
14.
Magee, J. M.(2000)。Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle。Phronesis,45,306-330。
15.
Owens, J.(1980)。Form and Cognition in Aristotle。Ancient Philosophy,1,17-27。
16.
Robinson, Howard M.(1978)。Mind and Body in Aristotle。The Classical Quarterly,28,105-124。
17.
Silverman, A.(1989)。Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle’s De anima。Ancient Philosophy,9,271-292。
18.
Slakey, T.(1961)。Aristotle on Sense Perception。Philosophical Review,70,470-484。
19.
Tweedale, M. M.(1992)。Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form。Philosophical Topics,20,215-231。
20.
Ward, J. K.(1988)。Perception and Λόγος in De anima ii 12。Ancient Philosophy,8,217-234。
21.
Heinaman, R.(1990)。Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem。Phronesis,35,83-102。
會議論文
1.
Miller, Jr., F. D.(1999)。Aristotle’s Philosophy of Perception。The Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,177-213。
圖書
1.
Aristotle、Peck, A. L.(1942)。De Generatione Animalium。Massachusetts:Harvard University Press。
2.
Aristotle、Forster, E. S.(1955)。De Generatione et Corruptione。Massachusetts:Harvard University Press。
3.
Aristotle、Peck, A. L.(1937)。De Partibus Animalium。Massachusetts:Harvard University Press。
4.
Aristotle、Ross, W. D.(1956)。De Anima。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
5.
Aristotle、Ross, D.(1955)。De Sensu et Sensibilibus, Parva Naturalia。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
6.
Aquinas, T.、Foster, K.、Humphries, S.(1994)。Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima。Notre Dame, Indiana:Dumb Ox Books。
7.
Bernard, W.(1988)。Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles. Versuch einer Bestimmung der spontanen Erkenntnisleistung der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles in Abgrenzung gegen die rezeptive Auslegung der Sinnlichkeit bei Descartes und Kant。Baden-Baden:Koerner。
8.
Everson, S.(1997)。Aristotle on Perception。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
9.
Johansen, T. K.(1997)。Aristotle on the Sense-Organs。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。
10.
Makin, S.(2006)。Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
11.
Modrak, D.(1987)。Aristotle. The Power of Perception。Chicago:University of Chicago Press。
12.
Philoponus, J.、Hayduck, M.(1897)。Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria。Berlin:Reimer。
13.
Scaltsas, T.(1994)。Substance and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics。Ithaca:Cornell University Press。
14.
Aristotle、Minio-Paluello, L.(1949)。Categoriae。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
15.
Aristotle、Ross, W. D.(1950)。Physica。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
16.
Gregoric, P.(2007)。Aristotle on the Common Sense。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
17.
Lear, Jonathan(1988)。Aristotle: The Desire to Understand。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。
18.
Polansk, Ronald(2007)。Aristotle’s De anima。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。
19.
Aristotle、Bywater, Ingram(1894)。Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
20.
Aristotle、Jaeger, Werner(1957)。Metaphysica。Oxford:Oxford University Press。
圖書論文
1.
Burnyeat, M. F.(1995)。Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
2.
Sorabji, R.(1979)。Body and Soul in Aristotle。Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology and Aesthetics。London:Duckworth。
3.
Burnyeat, M. F.(1995)。How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
4.
Burnyeat, M. F.(2001)。Aquinas on "Spiritual Change" in Perception。Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality。Leiden:Brill。
5.
Caston, V.(2005)。The Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception。Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
6.
Cohen, S. M.(1987)。The Credibility of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind。Aristotle Today: Essays on Aristotle’s Ideal of Science。Edmonton:Academic Printing and Publishing。
7.
Cohen, S. M.(1995)。Hylomorphism and Functionalism。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
8.
Freeland, C.(1995)。Aristotle on the Sense of Touch。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
9.
Nussbaum, M. C.、Putnum, H.(1995)。Changing Aristotle’s Mind。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
10.
Polansky, R.(1992)。Energeia in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX。Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 5: Aristotle’s Ontology。Albany, NY:SUNY Press。
11.
Shields, C.(1993)。Some Recent Approaches to Aristotle’s DE ANIMA。Aristotle’s De Anima Books II and III (with Passages from Book I)。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
12.
Sorabji, R.(1991)。From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality。Aristotle and the Later Tradition。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
13.
Sorabji, R.(1995)。Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception。Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
14.
Sorabji, R.(2001)。Aristotle on Sensory Process and Intentionality. A Reply to Myles Burnyeat。Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality。Leiden:Brill。
推文
當script無法執行時可按︰
推文
推薦
當script無法執行時可按︰
推薦
引用網址
當script無法執行時可按︰
引用網址
引用嵌入語法
當script無法執行時可按︰
引用嵌入語法
轉寄
當script無法執行時可按︰
轉寄
top
:::
相關期刊
相關論文
相關專書
相關著作
熱門點閱
1.
亞里斯多德論構想力
2.
潛能與限制--朗尼根《洞察》第十五章第四節釋義
3.
多瑪斯論潛能與實現原理
4.
空氣如何容受顏色?--亞里斯多德論中介物、光、與視覺
5.
存有者的種類--郎尼根《洞察》第十五章第三節釋義
6.
存有者的要素--郎尼根《洞察》第十五章第一至二節釋義
7.
多瑪斯在「亞里斯多德形上學註」中有關存在的一些分析
8.
多瑪斯哲學中「存在」的意義和重要性
無相關博士論文
無相關書籍
無相關著作
1.
僧肇的假名論與指涉的不可測度說
2.
從「物質性」概念追問技術
3.
瓦爾準與藍騰論仇恨言論
4.
評伯納德.所羅門著《論中國古代名家》
5.
Meaning and Morality: An Examination of the Meaning of Life
6.
理由整體主義與預設值理由
7.
論佛教倫理(學)以緣起法為闡述基礎的問題
8.
李光地《注解正蒙》太虛概念辨析
9.
論柏拉圖《蒂邁歐篇》之時間概念
10.
德性知識論與懷疑論:Linda Zagzebski《論知識論》
QR Code