Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) and Oliver’s (1991) the study examines the changes in the performance measurement system (PMS) of an emerging economy bank. The data for the study was collected through conducting interviews of senior executives and managers working at different management and operational levels in corporate office field offices.The findings indicate that changes in the bank’s PMS were a direct consequence of the changes in the bank’s institutional field. Coercive pressures, including regulatory changes and directives from the bank’s new President and Board, influenced the PMS through the requirement to adopt specific performance measures. Mimetic pressure was exerted through the eagerness of the bank to adopt best practices resulting in the introduction of contemporary banking products and technologies. Normative pressures were generated after the implementation of a staff training program, and through the professionalism of new top management. The bank responded to the pressures in two ways. In the initial period of the reforms most of the impetus to change originated as formal directives from the regulators, and the bank passively complied with the coercive pressures to gain legitimacy. As the performance of the banking sector improved and reforms proceeded, the bank increasingly applied strategic choice to the pressures to improve performance. While most previous studies have examined PMS change in the manufacturing sector, this study provides evidence on how PMSs are influenced by changes in their institutional fields and the way in which banks respond to such pressures.