本研究旨在探討銀行外部大股東、經理人持股是否影響銀行風險承擔程度，其次檢驗內部治理機制，包括董事會規模、董事會獨立性及官股持股能否影響經理人持股與銀行風險承擔兩者之間關係。本文以1997年至2013年國內銀行產業為研究對象，共計取得459筆有效樣本。研究發現，外部大股東提高銀行的風險承擔水準，顯示外部股東要求銀行承擔更高的風險。其次，經理人持股與銀行風險承擔呈現U字型關係，顯示經理人持股增加初期能夠降低銀行風險，然而經理人持股較高時，反而增加銀行風險。再者，董事會規模能夠減緩經理人持股過高所對銀行經營或破產風險造成的負面影響。另外董事會獨立性也能夠改善經理人持股對銀行破產風險及經營風險之影響。最後本文發現，官股銀行中，經理人持股與銀行破產風險呈現負向關係，顯示官股能夠有效降低銀行的經營風險。

This paper investigates the effect of external blockholders, managerial ownership on bank risk-taking, and examines whether board size, board independence, and state ownership influence the relation between managerial ownership and bank risk exposure. The research samples are banks consisting of 459 observations in Taiwan during 1997-2013. The empirical results indicate external blockholders increase bank risk-taking, suggesting that outside shareholders are prone to take more risk. Moreover, this study finds that the relationship between managerial ownership and bank risk-taking is U-shaped. Bank risk-taking decreases with managerial ownership at a low ownership level, but risk exposure increases with managerial ownership at a high ownership level. The results find that the adverse effect of managerial ownership on bankruptcy risk or business risk of bank disappears when the board size is large. Moreover, the board independence can mitigate the impact of managerial ownership on bankruptcy risk and business risk. Furthermore, managerial ownership is negatively related to bankruptcy risk in bank with state ownership, and is more effective in reducing business risk.