Wang, Yang-ming （1472-1529）, a Neo-Confucian philosopher in the Ming dynasty, criticizes that Chu Hsi's claim of ＂ko-chih kong-fu＂ implies that the hsin （mind;心） and li （理） are not identical. Therefore, the hsin in Chu Hsi's moral theory is merely a cognitive subject without immanent standard of moral judgment. If （A）: ＂that the hsin does not possess immanent standard of moral judgment in Chu's theory＂ withstands, then （B）: the fundamental premise of Chu's ko-chih kong-fu lies in that the hisn is merely a cognitive mind. The establishment with this conditional clause not only means that ko-chih kong-fu is a kind of cognitive kong-fu, but also leads to the following questions for Chu's moral theory. （1）: how can one decide/confirm that the principles one acquired from one's own empirical experience are actually 'moral', but not 'irrelevant to morality' or 'immoral'?＂ （2）: one's imprecise cognition of morality may cause one to make unsound moral judgment and thus act immorally. To solve these two problems, I argue that （P1）: Chu claims that the hisn possesses immanent ＂ch'ang-chih （the ordinary understanding of morality;常知）＂ which is not acquired through epistemic learning. （P2）: ch'ang-chih is the fundamental premise of Chu's ko-chih kong-fu. （P3）: through ko-chih kong-fu, one has to elevate one's ch'ang-chih to chen-chih（真知） to provide oneself justification for action. If （P1）, （P2）, and （P3） withstand, then the aforementioned two problems no longer exist, and it is reasonable to claim that Chu's ko-chih kong-fu is a reflective mode. I call it the argument of ＂Chu’s moral reflection＂.