| 期刊論文1. | 莊世同(20130900)。法律的概念與法律規範性的來源--重省哈特的接受論證。中研院法學期刊,13,1-36。 延伸查詢 | 2. | Kolodny, Niko(2005)。Why Be Rational?。Mind,114(455),509-563。 | 3. | Perry, Stephen(2006)。Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View。Fordham Law Review,75(3),1171-1209。 | 4. | Toh, Kevin(2005)。Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project。Legal Theory,11(2),75-123。 | 5. | Coleman, Jules L.(2011)。The Architecture of Jurisprudence。The Yale Law Journal,121(1),2-80。 | 6. | Green, Leslie(2008)。Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals。New York University Law Review,83(4),1035-1058。 | 7. | 王鵬翔(20100900)。反對安置命題。中研院法學期刊,7,141-208。 延伸查詢 | 8. | Greenberg, Mark(2004)。How Facts Make Law。Legal Theory,10(3),157-198。 | 9. | Greenberg, Mark(2014)。The Moral Impact Theory of Law。The Yale Law Journal,123,1288-1342。 | 10. | Hershovitz, Scott(2015)。The End of Jurisprudence。The Yale Law Journal,124(4),1160-1204。 | 11. | Plunkett, David(2013)。Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis。Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,33(3),563-605。 | 12. | Toh, Kevin(2007)。Raz on Detachment, Acceptance and Describability。Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,27(3),403-427。 | 13. | 王鵬翔(20140300)。接受的態度能夠證成法律的規範性嗎?--評莊世同〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源--重省哈特的接受論證〉。中研院法學期刊,14,387-405。 延伸查詢 | 研究報告1. | Kornhauser, Lewis(2015)。Doing without the Concept of Law。 | 2. | Waldron, Jeremy(2013)。Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs。 | 圖書1. | Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus(1982)。Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and political theory。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 2. | Dancy, Jonathan(2004)。Ethics Without Principles。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 3. | Raz, Joseph(2009)。The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 4. | Shapiro, Scott J.(2011)。Legality。Cambridge, MA:Belknap Press。 | 5. | Marmor, Andrei(2011)。Philosophy of Law。Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press。 | 6. | Raz, Joseph(1994)。Ethics in the Public Domain。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 7. | Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus(1983)。Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 8. | Scanlon, T. M.(2014)。Being Realistic about Reasons。Oxford University Press。 | 9. | Derek, Parfit(2011)。On What Matters。Oxford University Press。 | 10. | Scanlon, Thomas M.(1998)。What We Owe to Each Other。The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press。 | 11. | Raz, Joseph(1999)。Practical Reason and Norms。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 12. | Raz, Joseph J.(1986)。The Morality of Freedom。Oxford University Press。 | 13. | Broome, John(2013)。Rationality Through Reasoning。Wiley-Blackwell。 | 14. | Kelsen, Hans(1960)。Reine Rechtslehre。Wien:Franz Deuticke。 | 15. | von Wright, Georg Henrik(1963)。Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry。London:Routledge & Kegan Paul。 | 16. | Alexy, Robert(2002)。The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 17. | Kelsen, Hans(1934)。Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik。Wien:Franz Deuticke。 | 18. | Murphy, Liam(2014)。What Makes Law: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。 | 19. | Dworkin, Ronald M.(1978)。Taking Rights Seriously。Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press。 | 20. | Dworkin, Ronald(1986)。Law's Empire。Cambridge, MA:Belknap Press。 | 21. | Dworkin, Ronald(2011)。Justice for Hedgehogs。The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press。 | 22. | Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus、Bulloch, Penelope A.、Raz, Joseph(1994)。The Concept of Law。Clarendon Press:Oxford University Press。 | 23. | Dworkin, Ronald M.(2006)。Justice in Robes。Belknap Press of Harvard University Press。 | 24. | Raz, Joseph(2009)。Between Authority and Interpretation。Oxford。 | 25. | Knowles, Dudley(2010)。Political Obligation: A Critical Introduction。Routledge。 | 圖書論文1. | Dickson, Julie(2012)。Legal Positivism: Contemporary Debates。The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law。New York, NY:Routledge。 | 2. | Wang, Peng-Hsiang、Wang, Linton(2015)。Rules as Reason-Giving Facts: A Difference-Making-Based Account of the Normativity of Rules。Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following。Springer。 | 3. | Shapiro, Scott J.(2007)。The 'Hart-Dworkin' Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed。Ronald Dworkin。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。 | 4. | 謝世民(2015)。理性之規範性。理由轉向。台北:臺大出版中心。 延伸查詢 | 5. | Correira, Fabrice、Schneider, Benjamin(2012)。Grounding: An opinionated introduction。Metaphysical Grounding。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。 | 6. | Essert, Christopher(2016)。A Theory of Legal Obligation。The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 7. | Finlay, Stephen、Plunkett, David(2017)。Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory。Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law。 | 8. | Greenberg, Mark(2011)。The Standard Picture and Its Discontents。Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 9. | Greenberg, Mark(2018)。The Moral Impact Theory, the Dependence View and Natural Law。The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。 | 10. | Paulson, Stanley(1992)。[Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory] Introduction。Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 11. | Rosen, Gideon(2010)。Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction。Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 12. | Stavropoulos, Nicos(2012)。Obligations, Interpretivism and the Legal Point of View。The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law。New York, NY:Routledge。 | 13. | Stavropoulos, Nicos(2013)。Words and Obligations。Reading HLA Hart's The Concept of Law。Oxford:Hart Publishing。 | 14. | Radbruch, Gustav(1999)。Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht。Gustav Radbruch Rechtsphilosophie: Studienausgabe。Heidelberg:C. F. Müller Verlag。 | 15. | Enoch, David(2011)。Reason-Giving and the Law。Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law。Oxford University Press。 | |