本文利用循序談判賽局探討在品質異質的雙占價格競爭中，業外品質技術擁有者的授權行為。本文得到：（1）如果新技術屬於利潤極大化的業外廠商，則當授權前的品質競爭不激烈，新技術授權給高品質廠商並收取策略授權金；當授權前的品質競爭激烈，但是新技術提高品質有限，以傳統授權金移轉技術給高品質廠商；當授權前的品質競爭激烈，但是新技術可以大幅提升品質，以傳統授權金移轉技術給低品質廠商為最有利。（2）如果新技術屬於政府，政府會希望將新技術移轉給低品質廠商；當新技術與高品質差異不大時，需補貼低品質廠商使用新技術。

We analyze the optimal licensing strategy of an outside patent holder of a superior quality technology for a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality in a finite stage sequential bargaining game. Two types of fixed-fees are considered, a strategic one and the conventional one. If the new technology is owned by a revenue maximizing outsider, it is shown that the optimal licensing strategy is transferring the patent (1) to the original high quality firm with a strategic fixed fee when the quality difference between the duopoly is large enough, (2) to the original high quality firm with a conventional fixed fee when the quality difference is small and the new technology helps little, and (3) to the original low quality firm with a conventional fixed fee, otherwise. If the new technology is owned by a social welfare maximizing government agency, it is shown that transferring technology to the low quality firm is optimal and a subsidy is required in case the new quality is improved very little.