| 期刊論文1. | 王文方(20070300)。虛擬條件句理論述評。國立臺灣大學哲學論評,33,133-182。 延伸查詢 | 2. | Beebee, H.(2018)。Philosophical Scepticism and the Aim of Philosophy。Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,118(1),1-24。 | 3. | Brandom, R.(2007)。Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,74(3),651-676。 | 4. | van Inwagen, P.(1998)。Modal Epistemology。Philosophical Studies,92,67-84。 | 5. | Williamson, T.(2016)。Abductive Philosophy。The Philosophical Forum,47(3/4),263-280。 | 6. | 王文方(20070200)。古德曼的共同支撐理論述評。東吳哲學學報,15,109-145。 延伸查詢 | 圖書1. | Goodman, Nelson(1955)。Fact, Fiction and Forecast。Harvard University Press。 | 2. | Kripke, S.(1980)。Naming and Necessity。Harvard University Press。 | 3. | Williamson, Timothy(2007)。The Philosophy of Philosophy。Wiley-Blackwell。 | 4. | Millikan, R. G.(2004)。Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures。Cambridge, MA:MIT Press。 | 5. | Kind, Amy、Kung, Peter(2016)。Knowledge through Imagination。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 圖書論文1. | Giunchiglia, F.、Fumagalli, M.(2016)。Concepts as (Recognition) Abilities。Formal Ontology in Information Systems。IOS PRESS。 | 2. | Williamson, T.(2016)。Knowing by Imagining。Knowledge Through Imagination。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | 3. | Williamson, T.(2017)。Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology。Reflections on the Liar。Oxford:Oxford University Press。 | |