This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger’s Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the “presence” of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is “letting-be” of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, which is usually treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein’s disclosedness. Therefore, Heidegger adopts the second approach.