The Warring States system in ancient China was characterized by the interaction between two strategies entitled Ho Tsung and Lien Heng. The former was advanced by Su Ch’in while the latter was proposed by Chang I. the thought of Ho Tsung suggested that a stable international system should be associated with the following feature. First, the potential hegemonic power will be blocked by a counter-aliance which involves all of the other great powers in the system. The bipolarization of international system implies that the potential victims of the most powerful state will target their resources at the latter. Second, the policy of “appeasement” is turned down by the potential victims since it will facilitate the success of the emerging hegemonic power. Third, the geopolitical interdependence among the potential victims is justified so that they can check and balance the growing hegemonic power through mutual assistance. The lack of cooperation among the potential victims, according to the domino theory, will bring about the collapse of the entire system. The strategy of Lien Heng demands that the stability of an international system should be based on the understanding of the following facts by its members: First, the multipolarization of international conflicts is inevitable. Second, the geopolitical vulnerability and fragility among potential victims will be furthered if these states initiate a campaign against the emerging hegemonic power. Third, “appeasement” is a policy critical to the survival of the potential victims. The system will secure if a series of bilateral alliances between the emerging hegemonic power and others are created. The empirical test shows that the Warring States system was dominated by Lien Heng Strategy. The eventual break-down of the system illustrated the inconsistency between Lien Heng theory and international political reality. This finding reveals three logic problems implied in the concept of Lien Heng. First, it seems a mistake to garget national resources at potential allies rather than the emerging hegemonic power. Second, it is highly doubtful to assume that a state can survive the aggression of a potential dominant power through an appeasement policy. Third, the proposal to build bilateral “apathy-oriented coalitions” instead of a potential dominant power through an appeasement policy. Third, the proposal to build bilateral “apathy-oriented coalitions” instead of a multipolar “balancing-oriented coalition” in dealing with a rising dominant power is totally inconsistent with the balance of power theory. It would be far more convincing to perceive Lien Heng as a strategy leading to the breakup rather than the stability of an international system.