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題名:經理人固守職位、聲譽與內部報告
書刊名:交大管理學報
作者:詹家昌 引用關係劉維琪 引用關係吳欽杉
作者(外文):Chan, Cha-chungLiu, Victor W.Wu, Chin-shun
出版日期:1996
卷期:16:2
頁次:頁113-138
主題關鍵詞:聲譽固守職位內部報造ReputationEntrenchmentInternal reporting
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(4) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:19
本文說明了在一個資訊不對成稱公司中,經理人的内部報告決策。與以往有關的研究相較(如Sridhar, 1994),我們考慮了在聲譽與固守職位的聯合誘因下,賽局存在的混合解與分離解條件。相信在解釋經理人的複雜行為上有其實證上的貢獻。
In this paper, we demonstrate the managerial internal reporting policy when information asymmetries exist within a firm. In contrast to earlier studies (see of Sri S. Sridhar, 1994), we find that in the presence of both reputation and entrenchment incentives, there are many conditions under which pooling and separating equilibria are established. We believe this results can contribute to the explanation of the complicated managerial behavior.
期刊論文
1.Jensen, M. C.、Meckling, W. H.(1979)。Rights and production functions: An application to labor-managed firms and co-determination。Journal of Business,52(4),469-506。  new window
2.Hirshleifer, D.、Thakor, A. V.(1992)。Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt。Review of Financial Studies,5(3),437-470。  new window
3.Dye, R. A.(1988)。Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model。Journal of Accounting Research,26(2),195-235。  new window
4.Scharfstein, D.(1988)。The disciplinary role of takeovers。Review of Economic Studies,55(2),185-199。  new window
5.Bebchuk, Lucian A.、Stole, Lars A.(1993)。Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?。Journal of Finance,48(2),719-729。  new window
6.Hirshleifer, D.(1993)。Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions。Financial Management,22(2),145-160。  new window
7.Holmstrom, B.、Costa, R. C.(1986)。Managerial Incentives and Capital Management。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,101(4),835-860。  new window
8.Gilson, S. C.(1990)。Management Turnover and Financial Distress。Journal of Financial Economic,25,241-262。  new window
9.Narayanan, M. P.(1985)。Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results。Journal of Finance,40(5),1469-1486。  new window
10.Nagarajan, N. J.、Stvaramakrishnan, K.、Sridhar, S. S.(1995)。Managerial Entrenchment, Reputation and Corporate Investment Myopia。Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,10(3),565-585。  new window
11.Broadberry, S. N.(1994)。Why was Unemployment in Postwar Britain so Low?。Bulletin of Economic Research,46,241-261。  new window
12.Furubotn, E. G.、Pejovich, S.(1973)。Property rights, economic decentralization & the evolution of the Yugoslav firm, 1965-1972。Journal of Law and Economics,16(2),273-302。  new window
13.Narayanan, M. P.(1985)。Observability and the Payback Criterion。Journal of Business,58(3),309-323。  new window
14.Baiman, S.、Evand, J. H. III(1983)。Predecision Information and Participative Management Control Systems。Journal of Accounting Research,21,371-395。  new window
15.Banting, K. G.(1988)。Federalism, Social Reform and the Spending Power。Canadian Public Policy,14,81-92。  new window
16.Conroy, R.、Hughes, J.(1987)。Delegating Information Gathering Decisions。The Accounting Review,62(1),50-66。  new window
17.Sridhar, Sri S.(1994)。Managerial Reputation and Internal Reporting。The Accounting Review,69(2),343-363。  new window
18.Verrecchia, Robert E.(1983)。Discretionary disclosure。Journal of Accounting and Economics,5(1),179-194。  new window
19.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1989)。Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control。American Economic Review,79(4),842-852。  new window
20.Trueman, Brett(1986)。The Relationship Between the Level of Capital Expenditures and Firm Value。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,21(2),115-130。  new window
21.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307。  new window
22.Jensen, Michael C.、Ruback, Richard S.(1983)。The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence。Journal of Financial Economics,11(1-4),5-50。  new window
23.Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1989)。Management Entrenchment: The Case Of Manager-Specific Investments。Journal of Financial Economics,25(1),123-139。  new window
24.Fama, Eugene F.、Jensen, Michael C.(1983)。Agency Problems and Residual Claims。The Journal of Law and Economics,26(2),327-349。  new window
25.Kreps, David M.、Wilson, Robert(1982)。Sequential Equilibria。Econometrica,50(4),863-895。  new window
圖書
1.Berle, Adolf Augustus Jr.、Means, Gardiner C.(1932)。The Modern Corporation and Private Property。Macmillan Publishing Company。  new window
圖書論文
1.Holmström, B.(1982)。Managerial Incentive Problem: A Dynamic Perspective。Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck。Helsinki:Swedish School of Economics。  new window
2.Coffee, J. C.(1988)。Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web。Knights, raiders, and Targets。New York:Oxford University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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