當被保險人在契約簽定後，擁有隱藏性訊息時，從倫理觀點來看，相關的自我損 失預防及維護訊息之改變，必需傳遞給保險人，唯有如此，方能避免事後逆選擇的發生。在 本文中，我們認為在反映完全訊息傳遞與接受的競爭性保險市場中，其至佳均衡解必需是為 一足額保險之分隔均衡。因此，在無逆選擇之情況下，不存在有交叉補貼。此外，依據強性 保險倫理準則，檢定其他均衡模型之效率，我們最後歸納出可能存在的至佳、善佳、次佳、 再次佳均衡解。

　　　　　When agents(insured)possess hidden information after the contracts being made, from ethical point of view, the new signals about the extent of self-protection must be sent to the insurer which are essential for avoiding ex-post adverse selection and cross-subsidization. In his paper we provide the strong insurance ethic criteria and argue that for both efficiency and equity, a separating equilibrium with ex-ante and ex-post signaling is the utmost best one for the competitive insurance markets. We then provide the taxonomy of market efficiency and utillze that to assess several well-known insurance models and, in turn, find its utmost best, first best, second best and third best equilibrium.