由於存保契約雙方的權利、義務不對稱及存保公司對要保銀行不當的擔保、寬容 ，使得存保公司與要保銀行間存在著值得注意的代理問題。然而，過去文獻對於存保價值的 探討，多是將其視為存保公司出售給要保銀行的「單一」選擇權形式，並未考量存保公司的 「資本寬容」、主管機關的「強制停業權力」及要保銀行基於自身利益考量的「自動停業點 」等三項主要形成存保契約代理問題的因素，本研究即是針對此一缺點進行修正，將存保契 約由原先的單一賣權形式修改為一種美式可續可贖回的賣權（ callable perpetual American put option ），推導得一修正後之存款保險評價模式，並以國內上市入保銀行近 三年之財務資料進行實證研究， 得到金融主管機關之最適強制停業點為 0.9085，而合理的 存保費率則為 0.0002786，且停業政策是主管機關實施銀行資本管制的重要輔助監理措施。

　　　　　There exists significant agency problems between deposit insurance cor- poration and insured banks due to the asymmetricity of rights to obligations in d eposit insurance contract and the inadequate forbearance of deposit insurance co rporation to insured banks. The deposit insurance contract is considered as a si mple put option in the previous studies.However, the researchers have ignored the agency problems caused by some factors, such as capital forbearence of deposit insurance corporation, enforcing closure policy of financial regulators, and self-closure of insured banks. From the perspective of agency theory, this study extends Allen & Saunders (1993) callable perpetual American put option and hence derives a modified model for pricng deposit insurance value. In addition, we also use the financial data of Taiwan's listed banks to perform empirical study on optimal closure policy and capital adequacy of those banks.