The main purpose of this study is to investigate effects on the market competition while an exclusive dealing arrangement is used and to understand under what circumstances that the exclusive dealing arrangement could impede fair competition. Furthermore, our study also attempt to provide regulation criterions for the authorities. 　　The results of this study are summarized as follows: 1.A firm may adopt the exclusive dealing arrangement based based on the following reasons: (1)protecting property rights and business secrets, (2)ensuring the product quality, (3)facilitating in investing assets or in implementing long term plan, (4)facilitating a new firm in entering market, (5)reducing costs to increase efficiency, (6)forming an entrance barrier to exclude competitors, (7)raising the cost of competitors, (8)avoiding forming cartel that may violate fair competition. 2.We observe that when the exclusive dealing arrangement is implemented, it benefits the manufacturers most and may also benefit the dealers, but it dis- advantages the manufacturers' competitors. As to the consumers, the impact is unconcluded. 3.To judge whether the exclusive dealing arrangement has no significant effect on anticompetition, we provide three standard inspections. A firm has to take three standard inspections when the market share of the firm is over 10%. 4.Based on the regulation criterions proposed by us, we observe that while dealing with the lubricant oil case of Chinese Petroleum Co., the Fair Trade Commission cannot take all factors into consideration that may lead to an improper verdict.