自從Brander & Spencer提出出口補貼具有所謂利潤移轉(profit shifting)功能 之概念後，一國政府如何利用策略性貿易政策(strategic trade policy)以增加本國福利， 成了往後國際貿易理論發展之重點。但是上述之結論乃是基於一些特定之假設，出口補貼為 最佳貿易政策的結論會受到市場上許多其他因素之影響。不過以往在探討此項問題時偏重分 析產品市場結構對出口補貼之影響，對於生產因素市場結構與出口補貼之關連性較少分析， 本文則考慮國內工會之存在對出口補貼利潤移轉動機之影響。以一兩階段之賽局進行分析， 假設本國廠商與本國工會之工資與雇用量之決定係透過一Nash議價過程。結果顯示：出口補 貼利潤移轉的功能，並不會受到工會存在之影響。但是一般而言，在工會為工資導向(wage oriented)時，通常需要一較高之補貼；就雇用量導向(employment oriented)之工會而言， 補貼之水準則較低；而且此一結果並不受到外國政府課徵平衡稅之影響。

　　　　　The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of trade unions on profit-shifting ability of export subsidies. A Cournot duopoly model of a domestic unionized firm and a foreign firm is developed. Trade policy is modeled as a two stage game. In the first stage, the domestic government sets an optimal subsidy level, and in the second stage the negotiated wage and employment (output) levels are simultaneously determined through an efficient Nash bargaining process. It is shown that in general the optimal subsidy level is higher in the wage-oriented trade union than in the employment-oriented trade union. In addition, the results will not be changed qualitatively by introducing a foreign government that imposes countervailing duties.