New issues of stock by public-owned company (seasoned new issues) often hurt current stockholders. Whenever the new shares are sold below the current market price and current stockholders not able to absorb all the new issues, the stock prices are diluted and wealth is transferred from current stockholders to new stockholders. Writers of covered warrants, holding large cash position for hedging the warrants, are potentially damaged by the wealth-transferring effect of seasoned new issuing during the life of warrants. This paper develops precise method to estimate the warrant issuers' losses due to the wealth-transfer-ring effect. We show that the amount of losses is inversely related to the percentage of new shares that current stockholders allowed to acquire, and positively related to the price discount of new shares. Covered warrants usually include adjustment provision for seasoned new issuing. The exercise prices are adjusted lower in order to neutralize the dilution effect. Similar provision can be included such that the warrant holders share all or part of the issuers' wealth-transferred losses. We propose a two-step approach to mitigate the wealth-transfer effect. First, the exercise prices are adjusted downward proportionally to neutralize the dilution effect. Second, issuers reset the exercise prices to a slightly higher level to compensate their losses. The level of new exercise price is determined such that the expected compensation, considering the impact of exercise probability, equals the amount of losses transferred to the warrant holders.