Russia's relationship with China and their arms sales have aroused a great deal of uneasiness in Asia and the United States. Upon examination of this military relationship, one finds that Russian policy apparently is excessively dependent on China for entry into Asian security agendas. Moreover, its military sales have been used to bail out the Russian defense industry, which would otherwise face bankruptcy and the resultant collapse of Russia's armed forces. In addition, China's actual payments have apparently been relatively cheap, and have often taken the form of noncash substitutes or transfer of licenses and technology to China. Thus, China has reaped tangible political and military gains, while Russia's gains have only been psychological and evanescent. Worse yet, many Russian military and political figures still regard China as a potential future threat and see little true gain in Russia arming it. In the overall Asian context, these fears have assumed more substance. In short, Russian policy seems all too locking in any sense of true national interests or a strategic perspective.