本研究採路線別方式分別對服務路線與一般路線進行虧損補貼及績效補貼，結合 公式型補貼及申請型補貼，並考慮中央與地方階層性的政府決策行為建立二階層補貼分配模 式，進行補貼計畫的選取與補貼款的分配。其中地方政府的目標為追求各地方補貼總效益最 大，而中央政府的目標為追求各地方補貼效益的差異最小，限制式則為補貼預算之限制。經 由敏感度分析發現，補貼分配模式中之參數如:公式補貼款補貼業者比例、及地方配合款比 例等的改變，將會影響計畫的選取與補貼款的分配。而服務路線與一般路線計畫的選取關係， 則受到兩種補貼計畫效益權重比值的影響。

　　　　　The allocation mechanism of transit subsidy in this study is to subsidize the transit operators by route. Routes can be class fled into service routes and non-service routes, and deficit-base subsidy and performance-base subsidy will be used for these routes respectively. This study considers both the formula subsidy and discretion subsidy. The subsidy allocation problem is formulated as the bi-level government decision making model. The objective of each local government is to maximize its local benefit of subsidy while the central government is to minimize the difference of the subsidy effects among local governments and subject to subsidy budget constraints. The results of case study show that the change of parameters: the ratio of formula subsidies for the operators and the ratio of matching funds to total subsidies, will affect the results of selecting the projects and allocating the subsidies. Besides, the weight of project-benefit for service routes over non-service routes will affect the probability of selection between two kinds of projects.