本研究旨在以聲譽的觀點，由理論層面探討上市公司管理者的投資專案選擇行為 ，與投資專案宣告時，股價所可能產生的異常變動現象。研究結果顯示，在資訊不對稱的情 況下，依管理者聲譽評價及投資專案評價，兩者比值的高低，若投資專案評價較為重要，則 能力好的與能力差的管理者皆會選擇長期投資專案；若管理者聲譽評價較為重要，則能力好 的管理者會選擇短期投資專案，能力差的管理者則會選擇長投資專案。由投資專案選擇的行 為，本研究進一步推論，股票市場對宣告短期投資專案公司的股價，會有正異常報酬反應； 宣告長期投資專案公司的股價，則會有負的或沒有異常報酬反應。

　　　　　Using the reputation concept, this study examines the managerial choice behavior of project investment and infers its announcement effect. The demonstrates that, under informational asymmetry, managerial investment decision is based on the reputation effect and the preference of investors. When reputation effect outweighs the preference of investors, both good and bad managers pool at long term investment projects, otherwise, good managers choose short-term projects while bad managers the long-term. According to this distortion behavior, in terms of the NPV criteria, this study suggests that stock return is positive from a short-term investment announcement, and non-positive from a long -term announcement.