最近幾年來最低工資的採行對就業到底是會造成正面或負面的影響，在理論與實 證的研究上引起廣泛熱絡的討論與爭辯。其中，Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)利用一修正的 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)勞工同質的效率工資模型，證明最低工資的採行在效率工資模 型中會促進就業的增加。本文放寬Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的模型中勞工同質的假設而 為勞工異質，卻發現最低工資的採行會使就業減少而非增加。由於勞工異質較勞工同質的假 設切合實際，本文反駁Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的論點。

　　　　　This paper uses the revised shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), as revised by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), to investigate the employment effect of a minimum wage law. It is shown that when workers are homogeneous, a binding minimum wage may increase employment. However, when workers are heterogeneous, a minimum wage law that increases employment is not binding; a binding law, by contrast, decreases employment. Since the assumption of worker heterogeneity is more realistic, this study rebuts the validity of Rebitzer and Taylor's (1995) argument that a minimum wage law may increase employment in a shirking model with efficiency wages.