自由主義者通常主張應寬容多元的價值觀，雖然有些人並不認為自由主義者能夠對 多元主義的主張提出令人心服的理論。羅爾斯在其近著《政治自由主義》就企圖要為自由主 義的寬容提出合理的說明。在<The Law of Peoples>一文中，羅爾斯主張，自由主義者也能 為我們所處世界裡的國際關係提出一項國際寬容的理論，其中常見的情況是，不同的國家常 對政治合法性及社會正義有不同的看法。依羅爾斯之見，國際寬容的要求不只是出自於一種 所謂的暫行協議，而應是一種的道德要求。此外，所應寬容的不只是世人所擁抱的多元價值; 羅爾斯主張國際寬容的理論認為一個國家，當滿足若干要求時，其所抱持以及實踐的政治合 法性和社會正義的看法應被尊重。就此而言，羅爾斯主張一個非自由主義的國家也能是具有 合法性的。這頗異於典型的自由主義對政治合法性的看法。許多人(包括自由主義者)都批評 羅爾斯這項主張，批評者認為羅爾斯這樣的主張會陷入一種困境:或者是自我毀棄羅爾斯自己 在《A Theory of Justice》自由主義的立場或者是一個無法建立國際多元主義的失敗的國際 寬容理論。在本文中，我嘗試為適當修正過的羅爾斯的國際寬容主張辯護。在說明羅爾斯主 張何以能避開批評者所提的困境，我認為我們應重新思考羅爾斯在《A Theory of Justice》 和《Political Liberalism》兩書中所提出的道德思慮的方法學，適當地使用這個道德方法 學能幫助我們處理國際政治多元性裡的一些重要的議題。

　　　　　Liberals often argue for toleration of plurality of values, though it is not often entirely clear how this liberal requirement of toleration can be satisfactorily accountable. John Rawls's recent work, Political Liberalism, is intended to do just that-providing an account of the requirement of toleration in liberal democratic society. In "The Law of Peoples," Rawls maintains that a notion of international toleration can be advanced a world where nation-states typically embrace diverse conceptions of political legitimacy and social justice. International toleration, in Rawls's view, is not just a modus vivendi. It is a moral requirement. However, what is and should be tolerated is not just diverse doctrines of value that people in the world come to cherish. Rather, what Rawls's theory of international toleration attempts is a view that states, on meeting certain conditions, ought to be respected by other states with regard to their diverse conceptions of political legitimacy and social justice. In this view, Rawls claims that a non-liberal state can be a legitimate state as well. This is very different from a typical liberal view of political legitimacy. Many, including liberals, criticize Rawls in this regard. Rawls's view, according to critics, is trapped in a dilemma: it is either self-undermining or a failure. According to critics, if Rawls's attempt would be successful, then it would undermine his own liberal theory proposed in A Theory of Justice. On the other hand, if it is nonetheless liberal in character, then it fails to establish what it aims—tolerating political diversity. In this paper, I attempt a defense of a Rawlsian view of international toleration, which requires some modifications to Rawls's view. In showing that Rawls's project is neither self-undermining nor impossible, I argue that we have to re-consider how the methodology of moral deliberation, which Rawls proposes in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, can be adequately used to address some important issues concerning international political diversity.