成立於一九四四年的布列敦森林機制，以國際貨幣基金及世界銀行作為其執行單 位。其中，國際貨幣基金的角色主要在維繫戰後金融與貨幣秩序，期望能在穩定匯率秩序下 ，帶領各國復甦其經濟，以促進國際貿易的推動，提昇各國人民的福祉。國際貨幣基金在會 員國發生國際收支困難時，可以提供暫時的融資，協助該國解決收支赤字的問題。在美國的 主導下，國際貨幣基金對於會員國提供融資援助時，必須附帶執行制約條件，以確保國際貨 幣基金資源得以不斷循環使用。美國透過制約條件中的緊縮方案與自由化政策，成功地將貨 幣主義學派的觀念推銷至全球，並促使許多中低度開發國家開放市場。不過，國際貨幣基金 的融資計劃卻面臨兩難的局面：包裹著制約條件的國際融資行動，一方面間接維護了美國及 西歐、日本等主要工業國家官方及私人商業銀行的債權，但另一方面，也使得許多原本就面 臨國際收支困難的國家，遭受更嚴重的經濟衰退與政治不安。雖然如此，在國際社會尚未能 創造另一個有別於現存的機制之前，發生經濟困難的會員國卻也只能別無選擇地接受國際貨 幣基金的制約條件。

　　　　　The Bretton Woods Institution, established in 1944, gave the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank a mandate to enforce their institutional principles. The role of the IMF lies in maintaining the post-war financial and currency orders. The IMF is expected both to lead member countries in stimulating their economies as well as to facilitate international trade and enhance people's welfare. The IMF assists member countries suffering international payment problems by solving deficit problems via temporary financing. Due to insistence from the United States, the IMF must enforce conditionality while offering financing assistance so that the IMF can ensure the revolving use of its resources. At the same time, the United States has also successfully marketed concepts of monetarism all around the world and urged many developing countries to open their domestic markets by following the austerity and liberalization policies of IMF conditionality. However, the conditionality of the IMF's financing program has created a dilemma. On the one hand, the international financing program has protected creditor rights in both official and commercial banks in the western industrial states and Japan. On the other hand, the program worsened economic malaise and political instability in the deficit countries. Nevertheless, as long as the international society is unable to create a mechanism different from the IMF, these deficit countries have no other choice but to accept IMF conditionality.