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題名:經理人固守職位行為對融資決策影響之研究
書刊名:亞太管理評論
作者:詹家昌 引用關係許月瑜 引用關係
作者(外文):Chan, Chia-chungHsu, Yueh-yu
出版日期:1999
卷期:4:3
頁次:頁289-303
主題關鍵詞:固守職位資本結構EntrenchmentCapital structure
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(4) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:3
  • 點閱點閱:16
     本文主要研究經理人固守職位與資本結構的選擇,文中結果支持經理人為了固守 職位將避免採用負債,在橫斷面的分析上,本文發現當經理人的股權愈大將可能使用較高的 負債,當董事會規模愈大則可能降低負債水準。但當觀察負債水準的變動時,本文發現當前 任經理人非自願離職時,經理人將顯著增加負債水準;在股東監督方面,則大股東加入對公 司負債水準有顯著的影響。
     This paper studies the relationship between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that the leverage levels are higher when CEOs possess higher stock ownership, but the leverage levels are lower when the size of the board is larger. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that new CEOs tend to increase the leverage level after the involuntary departure of predecessor. In active monitoring, the addition to the board of major stockholders has signiticant effect on the leverage levels.
期刊論文
1.詹家昌、劉維琪、吳欽杉(19970400)。經理人固守職位與盈餘預估策略。交大管理學報,17(1),113-134。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.詹家昌、劉維琪、吳欽杉(19990900)。經理人固守職位與資本結構。輔仁管理評論,6(2),47-69。new window  延伸查詢new window
3.詹家昌、劉維琪、吳欽杉(1998)。經理人固守職位、股權與短視投資。管理與系統,5(1),33-58。  延伸查詢new window
4.Barton, S. L.、Gordon, P. J.(1987)。Corporate Strategy: Useful Perspective for the Study of Capital Structure?。Academy of Management Review,12(1),65-75。  new window
5.Dowen, R. J.、Bauman, W. S.(1997)。The Relationship Market Efficiency and Insider Ownership In Large Small firms。The Financial Review,32,185-203。  new window
6.Kooyul, J.、Yong-Cheol, K.、Stulz, R.(1996)。Timing, Investment Opportunity Managerial Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision。Journal of Financial Economics,42,156-186。  new window
7.Narayanan, M. P.(1985)。Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Result。Journal of Finance,40,1469-1484。  new window
8.Nagarajan, N. J.、Stvaramakrishnan, K.、Sridhar, S. S.(1995)。Managerial Entrenchment, Reputation and Corporate Investment Myopia。Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance,10,565-585。  new window
9.Shleifer, A.、Vishny, R. W.(1989)。Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Firm-Specific Assets。Journal of Financial Economics,25,123-139。  new window
10.Smith, J. C.(1986)。Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process。Journal of Financial Economics,15,3-29。  new window
11.詹家昌(19980900)。訊息、固守職位與投資決策。亞太經濟管理評論,2(1),31-45。new window  延伸查詢new window
12.Gilson, Stuart C.(1989)。Management Turnover and Financial Distress。Journal of Financial Economics,25(2),241-262。  new window
13.詹家昌、劉維琪、吳欽杉(19961200)。經理人固守職位、聲譽與內部報告。交大管理學報,16(2),113-138。new window  延伸查詢new window
14.Lipton, Martin、Lorsch, Jay W.(1992)。A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance。The Business Lawyer,48(1),59-77。  new window
15.MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.(1990)。Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?。The Journal of Finance,45(5),1471-1493。  new window
16.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1988)。Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),293-315。  new window
17.Berger, Philip G.、Ofek, Eli、Yermack, David L.(1997)。Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions。Journal of Finance,52(4),1411-1438。  new window
18.Yermack, David(1996)。Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors。Journal of Financial Economics,40(2),185-211。  new window
19.Baskin, Jonathan(1989)。An Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis。Financial Management,18(1),26-35。  new window
20.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307。  new window
21.詹家昌、劉維琪、吳欽杉(19971000)。風險、固守職位與經理人契約。企業管理學報,41,33-58。new window  延伸查詢new window
22.Jensen, Michael C.(1986)。Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers。The American Economic Review,76(2),323-329。  new window
23.Jensen, Michael C.(1993)。The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems。The Journal of Finance,48(3),831-880。  new window
24.Rosenstein, Stuart、Wyatt, Jeffrey G.(1990)。Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth。Journal of Financial Economics,26(2),175-191。  new window
25.Weisbach, Michael S.(1988)。Outside directors and CEO turnover。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),431-460。  new window
26.Harris, Milton、Raviv, Artur(1988)。Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),55-86。  new window
27.Myers, Stewart C.、Majluf, Nicholas S.(1984)。Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investor Do Not Have。Journal of Financial Economics,13(2),187-221。  new window
28.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
學位論文
1.詹家昌(1997)。經理人固守職位與長短期投資決策之研究(博士論文)。國立中山大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
單篇論文
1.Novaes, Walter,Zingales, Luigi(1995)。Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency。  new window
 
 
 
 
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