本文在雇主與員工之間對於員工努力工作與否的資訊不對稱情況下探討員工工作 誘因的設計。基本上，若缺乏適當的誘因，員工將不會努力為雇主工作而使雇主獲致最大利 益。因此，雇主必須設計一套補償計畫來誘使員工努力工作。但若同時存在有多位員工一起 工作時，其它員工的生產力將提供雇主某一員工是否努力工作的相關資訊。也就是說，每一 員工在抉擇自己的工作態度時，必須同時考慮到其它員工的工作努力程度。本文強調雇主將 會利用其它員工的生產力的資訊來設計一套誘因計畫以促使其員工為其努力工作。

　　　　　In this paper, we describe the incentive for the agents to work hard for the principal under the asymmetric information about the efforts spent by the agents between the principal and the agents. Typically, without a suitable incentive scheme, the agent will not spend the required efforts in maximizing the principal's profit. Therefore, the principal has to design a compensation scheme to induce the agents to work hard. However, when there exist more than one agents working for the principal, at least part of the information related to the efforts spent by one agent will be revealed through other agents' output. Therefore, the agent cannot spend his effort independently. We argue that the principal will employ the information revealed by other agents' work to design an appropriate incentive scheme to induce the agents to work hard for the principal.