本文旨在分析我國在八十八年四月間所發生的統籌分配款爭議過程，主要是從公共選擇觀點探討中央政府與縣市政府的角色與行為，以進一步理解爭議何以產生以及結果如何演變。 就規範的意義而言，統籌分配款被視為改善城鄉區域均衡發展的財源。然而在實際上，地方縣市政府做為一個自利行為者，主要考慮在於選區選民的偏好，以致使均衡城鄉發展之集體目標難以實現。本文之案例顯示，較富裕的城市（如臺北市及高雄市）不願減少本身財源來提高較貧窮縣市的福利。本文並提出幾點政策建議，包括建立地方政府財政努力的誘因機制，統籌分配款的制度化，以及制訂地方政府預算決算法。

　　　　　This paper analyzes the process of conflict in distributing equalization grants between central government and local governments in 1999,s Taiwan. We explore the role and activities of central government and local governments from public choice perspective, in order to understanding why the conflict existed and how the outcome turned out to be. Normatively, equalization grants has been conceived as a financial resources for improving regional development and moderating fiscal imbalance across urban area and rural area. Nevertheless, empirically, individual local government as a self-interested actor mainly focus on voter's preference and therefore make the collective objective undesirable. This case shows that the wealthy cities, such as Taipei City and Kaoshung City, is not willing to sacrifice themselves to increase the welfare of relatively poor counties. This paper also provides several policy recommendation regarding incentive mechanism of tax effort for local government, the institutionalization of equalization grants, and law-making for the budgeting process of local government.