當前,我國環境的根本問題是由粗放式的經濟發展模式所引起的,而這一發展模式的根源在于"中國式央地分權"下的政府行為。這種具有中國特色的分權模式的獨特之處在于中央政府對地方經濟放權的同時,仍然保持政治上的集權控制,上級政府根據績效考核提拔地方官員,即"經濟分權、政治集權"特性。中國式分權下,我國的環境治理體制依據行政區域的劃分來設置管理權限,按照政府層級的構成進行垂直式領導,即中央政府統一制定環境政策,地方政府負責各轄區內環境政策的執行。在全國范圍內,央地兩級政府的關系表現為動態的重復博弈。針對我國現行環境規制執行策略,借助演化經濟學研究工具,基于央地分權的視角,將地方政府與中央政府兩大主體同時納入分析框架。根據復制動態方程探討參與主體的行為演化特征和行為演化穩定策略,在模型求解的基礎上,利用MATLAB仿真工具,分析不同情形下參與主體演化穩定策略的走向及其收斂趨勢。研究發現,央地兩級政府在環境規制策略執行過程中的動態演化,很大程度上取決于地方政府環境規制執行力度、成本、收益和損失以及中央政府監管力度、成本和處罰力度等因素的大小。因此,針對地方政府環境策略激勵設計,應重點改革政績考核機制,引入市場機制,并通過環保補貼、財政轉移支付等手段降低地方政府環境規制執行成本;中央政府應通過調節政績考核體系中的經濟發展指標和環境指標的權重系數來加強對地方政府環境規制執行情況的監管力度,建立第三方監管機制以降低中央政府監管成本,制定合理的獎懲機制以提高監管效率;以期推動我國環境規制策略的高效執行,促進環境績效向經濟績效的良性轉換,實現雙重帕累托改進。

The fundamental problem of the environment is caused by the extensive mode of economic development,which originated from the government behavior under ‘the decentralization between central and local governments in China’. The reason for why this characteristic of decentralized model in China is unique lies in that even if the central government delegates economic powers to the local government,it still maintains the centralized political control,and the superior government promotes local officials in accordance with their performance appraisal,namely‘economic decentralization and political centralization’. Based on the perspective of China’s decentralization between the central and local governments,Chinese environmental management system sets up administrative rights according to the administrative divisions of the region,and provides vertical leadership in accordance with the constitution of the government level. This means that the central government develops a unified environmental policy,then the local government is responsible for implementing environmental policy in each jurisdiction. Nationally,the relationship between the central government and the local government shows a dynamic repeated game. In terms of implementing policies for environmental regulation,This paper uses evolutionary economics research tools to build an evolutionary game framework which includes the central and local governments.According to the replicator of dynamic equation,it explores the evolution of participants’ behavior and evolutionarily stable strategy,then on the basis of the model solution,This paper uses MATLAB simulation tools to analyse the participants’ evolutionarily stable strategy trends under different situations and its convergence trend. The results shows that dynamic evolution of the central and local governments during the implementation of environmental regulation policy,is mainly affected by implementation degree,costs,gains and loss of the local government ’s environmental regulation,and also the central government ’s regulatory supervision,costs,punishment and other factors. Thus,in the process of designing the incentive of the local government’s environmental policy,the local government should focus on the reform of the performance evaluation mechanism when introducing the market mechanisms,and reduce its costs of regulation enforcement through environmental subsidies,financial transfer payment and other methods. The central government should regulate the weight coefficient of economic development index and environmental quality indicators,reduce its regulatory costs by establishing a third-party monitoring mechanism,develop a reasonable incentive mechanism to improve the efficiency of supervision,promote the efficient implementation of environmental regulation policies,and encourage the benign transformation of environmental performance to economic performance,in order to achieve the dual Pareto improvement.