The game of economic development and ecological environment is the inevitable performance of China’s current transitional development. Government’s game behavior as the environmentalist is the inevitable result of Chinese-style decentralization at this stage. This paper takes the industrial haze governance of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and surrounding areas as its research object,puts forward the principal-agent model of the bureaucracy under the framework of the Chinese-style decentralization,and tries to find a solution to the idealized‘cooperation’game between central government guidance,local government response and enterprise emission reduction from the perspective of environmental regulation implementation. In this way,a non-cooperative evolutionary game model for the incomplete implementation of environmental regulation between central government,local governments and polluting enterprises is constructed. A simulation tool for proposed environmental regulation policies is used to analyze how central government controls local governments and polluting enterprises to realize ideal evolutionary game equilibrium. Model estimates indicate that such a set of tools,the administrative management of centralized environmental supervision,the transfer payment of reward and punishment system,the political punishment for environmental irresponsibility and the policy of environmental protection retained local tax revenue,are employed to solve problems involving inconsistent goals of local governments and polluting enterprises in the collective action of air pollution joint control. In more concrete terms,the central environmental supervision has strengthened the regulatory administration and organizational rigidity of‘reward and punishment’for local governments and polluting enterprises in the special transfer payment and environmental tax revenue. The combination of the three policy instruments makes the polluting enterprises move toward the evolutionarily stable strategy of implementing emission reduction,while the local government ’s evolutionary stable strategy is not regulated. Introducing the political losses of poor environmental performance into the utility function,the local government ’s evolutionary stable strategy turns into regulation because of the political punishment that is shocked by the central government. The retention of environmental protection tax revenues can dilute the political losses of local governments to a certain extent. However,a general finding is that the expectation of costs is an important reference for local government and polluting enterprises to make governance decisions based on the principle of maximizing profits. Therefore,in order to achieve Pareto improvement in the ideal evolutionary game equilibrium,it is necessary for the central government to strengthen centralized environmental management to avoid failure of local environmental regulations,and expand the scope of environmental protection expenditure to establish compensation mechanisms for emission reduction. Moreover,the central government should strengthen the environmental responsibility of local governments,support environmental technology innovation of polluting enterprises,improve the standards of environmental tax and guide public third-party supervision.