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題名:省域污染物總量控制指標差異性公平分配與優化算法研究--基於不對稱Nash談判模型
書刊名:中國人口.資源與環境
作者:段海燕王培博蔡飛飛趙婧辰王憲恩
出版日期:2018
卷期:2018(8)
頁次:56-67
主題關鍵詞:總量控制差異性公平區域差異行業差異不對稱Nash談判模型Total amount controlDifference fairnessRegional differenceIndustry differenceThe asymmetric Nash negotiation model
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公平合理的污染物排放總量控制指標分配是總量控制制度有效運行的關鍵環節。本文綜合考慮區域差異、行業差異等,研究總量控制指標差異性公平分配模式;設定區域差異情景、行業差異情景、一般耦合情景和綜合耦合情景,運用Nash談判模型建立政府橫向公平對比談判機制,研究區域污染物總量控制指標差異性公平分配的優化算法,并以吉林省的COD總量控制指標分解為例進行實例分析。結果顯示,與基準年排放量占比相比,基于區域差異的分配方案變化不大(-15.22%~4.48%),但基于行業差異的分配方案因化學纖維制造業(30.0%)和黑色金屬冶煉和壓延加工業(27.2%)配額影響而變化很大(-87.83%~154.22%)。考慮傳統總量指標配額行政直接分配模式單一,運用Nash談判模型對分配結果進行談判優化,結果顯示綜合耦合情景下的COD配額分配結果因綜合區域差異和行業差異而基本得到了所有市的認可,綜合滿意度為89.02%;而區域差異情景下的COD配額分配結果,因更接近于基準年排放量占比而得到除吉林市和通化市以外的其他7個城市的認可,優化博弈后的滿意度最高(89.25%);一般耦合情景和行業差異情景,因部分配額高指標行業集中到吉林市和通化市,存在很大的爭議;博弈結果顯示各市并不希望配額指標分配結果偏離基準年太多。因此,實現省域總量控制指標差異性公平分配,可引入政府橫向公平談判機制博弈優化差異性配置方案,識別滿意度最高或認可度最高的談判優化方案,實現總量控制指標分配的差異性公平。
The fair and reasonable allocation of total amount control index of pollutant emissions is the key point for the effective operation of the total amount control system. In this paper,we firstly studied the allocation model for regional total pollutant control index considering the regional differences and industry differences,etc. Then we set up the regional difference scenario,the industry difference scenario,the general coupling scenario and the comprehensive coupling scenario,and used the method of Nash Negotiation Model to introduce the government mechanism of horizontal fair comparison and negotiation,so as to study the optimization algorithm of difference fairness allocation. We took the decomposition of COD total amount control index in Jilin Province as an example. The results showed that the allocation of COD based on regional differences had a little change compared with that of the base year( the rate of change range from-15. 22% to 4. 48%). The allocation of COD based on industry differences varied greatly from the proportion of base year emissions( the rate of change range from-87. 83% to 154. 22%),as a result of the impact of chemical fiber manufacturing( 30. 0%) and ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry( 27. 2%). Since the traditional administrative direct distribution is single form, this paper used the Nash Negotiation Model to introduce the competition and supervision mechanism among governments. The results showed that COD allocation in the comprehensive coupling scenario had basically been approved by all cities due to the regional differences and industry differences. The comprehensive satisfaction rate was 89. 02%. However,the allocation of COD allocation under the regional difference scenario was approved by 7 cities because of the results close to the proportion of base year emissions,except Jilin City and Tonghua City. The comprehensive satisfaction was the highest( 89. 25%). Controversy existed in the general coupling scenario and the industry difference scenario,because of some industries with a higher allocation ratio in Jilin and Tonghua. The game result showed that each city did not want the allocation results to deviate from the base year. Therefore,to realize the difference fairness allocation of provincial total amount control index,we should introduce the horizontal fair comparison and negotiation of differential allocation and identify the highest satisfaction or highest recognition of negotiation optimization scheme,so as to achieve the difference fairness allocation of total amount control index.
 
 
 
 
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