本文在供應商和零售商需求信息不對稱的背景下,考慮了由一個供應商和兩個具有不平等地位零售商組成的供應鏈,運用信號博弈理論和完美貝葉斯納什均衡理論,研究批發價格合同下,供應鏈中存在的信息泄露和信息扭曲對供應鏈成員運營決策的影響。在批發價格合同下,供應商總會泄露市場地位高的零售商訂單信息,兩個零售商存在斯塔克伯格競爭。本文進一步研究分析,得到存在信息泄露的兩種均衡策略——分離均衡和混同均衡,給出零售商在不同市場需求條件下的訂購決策。本文還指出在一定條件下,供應商可能在信息泄露過程中扭曲信息,誤導市場地位低的零售商做出錯誤決策,供應商和市場地位高的零售商獲得更大利潤。當供應商扭曲信息時,盡管市場地位低的零售商利潤降低,但其仍將繼續留在市場中,零售商之間仍然保持水平競爭。最后,通過算例分析,對研究結論進行直觀驗證和說明。本文研究了供應鏈存在的信息泄露和信息扭曲問題,為現實中供應鏈各個主體行為提供理論依據。

In this work,information leakage and information distortion in a supply chain under a wholesale price contract are studied and theoretical basis is provided for the player’s motivation and decisions in reality.A supply chain consisting of a common supplier and two retailer with different market status,an incumbent and an entrant is considered.The incumbent can privately acquire actual demand state while the supplier and the entrant have no access to learn demand information but know the prior distribution of the demand state.Thus,there exists asymmetric demand information between the incumbent with the supplier and entrant.The paper shows that the supplier always leaks the incumbent’s order information to the entrant under a wholesale price contract.The entrant accepts the information being leaked by the supplier to assist order decision.Based on signaling game theory and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,two equilibrium strategies including the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium under information leakage are included and the ordering strategies of retailers under the different market demand states are shown.Further more,the supplier’s and the incumbent’s incentive with information distortion are studied and it is found that the supplier has an inventive to distort information to mislead the entrant to make wrong decisions in high demand state under the pooling equilibrium.The supplier and the incumbent more benefit under information distortion,whereas the entrant’s profit decreases.Because the entrant earns positive revenue to guarantee business activities,he will remain the market to horizontally compete with the incumbent.Finally,a numerical example is given to verify the conclusions and illustrates the impact of information leakage and distortion on the profits of three players.