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題名:具有風險傳導特徵的信息加工業務薪酬激勵研究
書刊名:中國管理科學
作者:許保光徐靜高敏剛邵雪焱
出版日期:2019
卷期:2019(10)
頁次:128-137
主題關鍵詞:信息加工委托代理薪酬激勵Information processingPrincipal-agent theorySalary incentive mechanism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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企業員工通過對信息進行加工處理得到支持企業決策的信息產品,然而由于業務本身的風險傳導性,前序環節的錯誤會隨著業務流程向后傳遞,在為企業創造價值的同時,也為企業帶來風險。基于委托代理理論,建立企業與員工之間產出相關的多代理人薪酬激勵模型,得到9種情形下的薪酬激勵方案及員工的最優決策。研究表明,有效的薪酬激勵方法可以促使員工選擇使企業凈收益最大的努力水平,從而達到降低企業風險的目的,并通過算例得到部分因素對員工及企業決策的影響。
The information processing business obtains regenerative information products that support enterprises’ decision-making through inspecting and processing information.Due to risk conductivity,not only value but also risks are created in the information processing business.Man-made error is one of the main reasons for risks of information processing business.To reduce the risks,an effective salary incentive mechanism is designed to improve the enthusiasm of employees.The information processing business with two links in series is considered in this paper.The output of the post-order employee is a nonlinear function of the effort level of both the pre-order employee and the post-order employee.Using process modeling technology and principal-agent theory,an incentive model for information processing business under incomplete information is established.The employees’ decision-making is to choose the optimal effort level which can achieve the largest net income.The enterprise’s decision-making is to set the optimal incentive coefficient so as to maximize its own interest.The salary incentive schemes and the employees’ optimal decision under the 9 circumstances are obtained.Example analysis shows that when selecting and deploying employees engaged in the information processing business,enterprises should select employees with higher levels of effort,and arrange the post-order employees with high accuracy rate of inspection.
 
 
 
 
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