清代云南食鹽專賣制度"官運制"的建立、運作過程中,反腐敗是中央政府建立和運行這一制度的主要核心。但是出于反腐敗的目的,鹽課正額和作為食鹽生產、運輸成本的盈余的定額都被長期固定,造成了燃料價格上漲背景下的成本經費不足。由此官僚被迫長期挪用經費,中央政府也不得不允許官僚自主挪用,造成了貪腐的新機會,也引起了中央的對官員的不信任。但是中央對于地方財政狀況卻難以具體把握,經費定額越發固定,對虧課的官僚懲處也越嚴厲,官僚則不斷將補償虧課壓力轉嫁給百姓,激起百姓反抗。以此"官運制"的運作為線索,可知清朝的清代財政中官僚腐敗與反腐的互動結構,即官僚在經費定額內的自主調配的必要性與中央對地方具體財政監管乏力的矛盾。最終,導致了社會矛盾的激化,"官運制"廢止。

Anti-corruption was the main reason for the Central Government to implement Yunnan-government salt monopoly in the Qing dynasty. However,because of the purpose of anti-corruption,the government-set salt taxation and the costs for salt production and transportation were fixed for a long time. With the rising fuel price,the costs became unbearable. Thus,the local officials had long resorted to the misappropriation of other funds,while the Central Government,though unsatisfied,had no other ways to avoid this,which led to new corruptions. Though the Central Government knew no details of the local financial situation,it carried more strict punishments on the tax losses whenever they occurred. As a result,the bureaucrats always transferred the tax losses to the ordinary people who finally rose in rebellion. Thus,Yunnan-government salt monopoly in the Qing dynasty revealed the interaction of bureaucratic corruption and anti-corruption in the financial operation of the Qing dynasty,that is,a reflection of the contradiction between the necessity of the independent distribution of the fixed funds by the local officials and the poor supervision of the local financial operation by the Central Government.